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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1994 through as late as August 2001, the United States
intelligence community1 received information that terrorists had
seriously contemplated using airplanes as instruments for carrying out
international terrorist attacks.2 This method of attack was clearly
“discussed in terrorist circles,” yet community analysts demonstrated
little effort to strategically counter such terrorist groups.3
Moreover, in 1998, U.S. intelligence received specific information
that “a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden
plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center.”4 In July
2001, senior government officials were warned of “a significant terrorist
attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks” that
would be “spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties . . . with
little or no warning.”5 Two months later, FBI and CIA units containing
no more than sixty combined personnel were assigned the specific task
of tracking terrorist kingpin Osama bin Laden, an intelligence method
later viewed as inadequate with respect to the severity of the destructive
threat involved.6
Despite these findings,7 the eleventh day of September 2001 reminded
1. “Intelligence community” “refer[s] to the group of fourteen government
agencies and organizations that, either in whole or in part, conduct the intelligence
activities of the United States Government,” including, but not limited to, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). ELEANOR HILL, JOINT INQUIRY STAFF STATEMENT, Part I,
at 6 (2002), available at http://i.CNN.net/CNN/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/18/intelligence.
hearings/intel.911.report.pdf. The intelligence community has various duties with respect to
countering terrorism, including: “[c]ollecting, analyzing, and disseminating information
regarding terrorist incidents and groups that perpetrate terrorism . . . ; [i]ssuing warnings
to policymakers to counter potential terrorist threats; [p]reventing, pre-empting, and
disrupting terrorist organizations; and [s]upporting diplomatic, legal, and military
operations against terrorism.” Id. at 7.
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 15; see also Report Cites Warnings Before 9/11, CNN.COM (Sept. 19,
2002), at http://www.CNN.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/18/intelligence.hearings. In June
1998, the United States received a stream of intelligence information from several
sources that Osama bin Laden considered planning attacks specifically in New York and
Washington, D.C. HILL, supra note 1, at 15.
5. Report Cites Warnings Before 9/11, supra note 4.
6. Id. In addition, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted two communications
sent by individuals in Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia on September 10, 2001, stating,
“Tomorrow is zero hour,” and, “The match begins tomorrow.” Kate Snow, FBI Seeks
Senators’ Records in 9/11 Leak Probe, CNN.COM (Aug. 24, 2002), at http://www.
CNN.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/24/attacks.congress.leaks/index.html. The messages
were not translated into English until September 12. HILL, supra note 1, at 22.
7. On July 24, 2003, Congress released more of the roughly eight-hundred-page,
ten-month joint investigation report, which was the product of five thousand interviews
and a review of nearly one million documents by House and Senate intelligence
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Americans of the “‘systemic problems (that) might have prevented our
government from detecting and disrupting al Qaeda’s plot.’”8 With constant
reminders of the haunting images now burned into our memories by the
international press, it is impossible to forget what transpired: four
hijacked aircraft, a Manhattan skyline stripped of its twin towers, a
gaping cavity in the Pentagon, and a death toll estimated at 2752 in New
York City alone.9 But where the actions and reactions of tireless cleanup
crews, dismayed firefighters, and grieving families were excessively
recorded, the voices of officials elected to handle this crisis before and
after it occurred were suppressed. After an attack seeped through the
cracks of U.S. intelligence, one question remained: How would the
nation’s political branches respond?
committees. Congressional Report Cites “Missed Opportunities” Prior to 9/11,
CNN.COM (July 24, 2003), at http://www.CNN.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/07/24/9.11.
report/index.html. The report illustrated additional security lapses leading to the
September 11, 2001 tragedies. It noted that at least fourteen people, who had helped six
of the hijackers “find housing, open bank accounts, obtain driver’s licenses and locate
flight schools,” had come to the FBI’s attention before the attacks. Id. In fact, the CIA
had tracked two particular hijackers, who later were aboard American Airlines Flight 77
that crashed into the Pentagon, “to California after the men were photographed at an al
Qaeda planning meeting . . . in January 2000,” a meeting where terrorists “were plotting
the attack on the USS Cole.” Brian Ross, Avoidable Tragedy? FBI Agent Didn’t Have
CIA Information About Sept. 11 Hijackers, ABCNEWS.COM (July 24, 2003), at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/world/ sept11_intel030724. html. The CIA’s intelligence
information was, however, not relayed to the FBI, whose San Diego-based agent could
have easily monitored the hijackers, particularly when both men rented rooms in the
house of the agent’s informant. Id. According to the Congressional Joint Inquiry
Report, this San Diego connection could have been “perhaps the Intelligence
Community’s best chance to unravel the September 11 plot.” Id. The report also
acknowledged: “The important point is that the Intelligence Community, for a variety of
reasons, did not bring together and fully appreciate a range of information that could
have greatly enhanced its chances of uncovering and preventing Usama Bin Ladin’s plan
to attack these United States on September 11, 2001.” S. REP. NO. 107-351, H.R. REP.
NO. 107-792, at xv (2002). Nearly two years after the September 11 attacks, the report
proclaimed that the government “still lacks a consolidated terrorism watch list that is
easily accessible to all law enforcement.” Pierre Thomas, Intelligence Failure: U.S.
Government Still Lacks Centralized Terrorist Watch List, ABCNEWS.COM (Apr. 29,
2003), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/US/sept11failure_030429.html.
8. Report Cites Warnings Before 9/11, supra note 4 (quoting Chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee Bob Graham). Graham noted that the intent of the
intelligence report was “not to point a finger or pin blame,” and that identifying and
stopping the threat “wouldn’t have taken a lot of luck. It would have taken someone
who could have asked and gotten answers to the right follow-up questions and then put it
together.” Id.
9. Dan Barry, A New Account of Sept. 11 Loss, with 40 Fewer Souls to Mourn,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A1.
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Part II of this Comment begins to answer that question with an
overview of the current political climate, focusing primarily on the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 200110 (Patriot
Act)—the legislature’s answer to “9/11.” Part II then summarizes the
resulting negative reaction by civil libertarians contending that the
Patriot Act unconstitutionally takes away individual freedoms under the
guise of stopping terrorism. As Part II demonstrates, public support for
the government’s position is hard to find.
Part III focuses on one of the legislature’s previous attempts to deter
terrorism. The integral Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
199611 (AEDPA) prohibits donations of material support and resources
to foreign terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda, so as to prevent the
United States from being used as a base for terrorist funding. Part III
first reviews the statute and its relevant antifundraising provisions12 and
then chronicles the AEDPA during a two-year time period in which it
overcame a variety of constitutional challenges, including those based on
the freedom of association and the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
Part IV documents the immediate downfall of the AEDPA and focuses
on the district court opinion in United States v. Rahmani,13 a post-9/11
decision declaring the AEDPA facially unconstitutional for violating
procedural due process.14 Part IV argues that the explosive nature of
contemporary international hostilities requires the nation to safeguard its
homeland before extending due process rights to terrorist organizations
and their supporters.
In defense of national security measures, this Comment provides four
factors that, if met, justify the AEDPA as an appropriate crisis law despite
its abridgement of some due process rights. These factors help distinguish
legitimate measures from previous blatant attacks on individual freedoms,

10. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 42 & 50 U.S.C.).
11. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214–1319 (codified in scattered sections of 8,
18, 28, 40 & 42 U.S.C.).
12. This Comment refrains from discussing the Act’s immigration provisions or its
impact on race relations, which have both incurred heavy criticism for targeting
minorities and foreigners. For a discussion on how the AEDPA targets Arab-Americans,
see generally Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United
States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2883 (2001) (suggesting
various corrective measures to achieve equal justice for Arabs in America); see also
Adrienne R. Bellino, Comment, Changing Immigration for Arabs with Anti-terrorism
Legislation: September 11th Was Not the Catalyst, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123,
123–24 (2002) (arguing that the AEDPA profiles Arabs as terrorists and enemies).
13. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
14. Id. at 1055.
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including the Alien and Sedition Acts of 179815 and the operation of
Japanese internment camps during World War II.16 Finally, Part IV
criticizes the Rahmani court for adjudicating the validity of the AEDPA
without appropriate statutory authorization.
The United States is not only fighting the war on terror overseas; it is
concurrently fighting a legal war to protect against terror domestically.
Amidst concern that 9/11 induced the government to overreact, this
Comment urges courts to assist the struggling intelligence community,
accept certain security measures, recognize that these measures may
justifiably encumber the Constitution, and resurrect the AEDPA.
II. THE CURRENT POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: PUSHING
FORWARD DESPITE PUBLIC DISSENT
With emotion still raw just three days after 9/11, both the Senate and
the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the “Authorization
for Use of Military Force” resolution.17 The resolution granted President
Bush the statutory authority to use U.S. Armed Forces against those
responsible for the attacks.18 Amidst concern over unwisely giving the
President too much leeway, especially because the resolution was the
first of its kind since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Senate Minority Leader
Trent Lott responded: “These are different times, and we must act
15. See 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 137 (2d ed. 2002).
16. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944) (upholding the
conviction of an American citizen of Japanese descent for remaining in a designated
“military area” from which all persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded).
17. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001) (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I 2001)) (signed by President Bush
on Sept. 18, 2001). “The resolution was formally introduced in the Senate on the
morning of September 14, 2001, passed immediately . . . by a vote of 98–0, passed later
that day by the House of Representatives after extensive discussion by a vote of 420–1,
and signed by the President on September 18, 2001.” David Abramowitz, The President,
the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use
of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 71, 71 n.1 (2002)
(discussing the manner in which members of Congress reached a compromise in drafting
the text of the resolution).
18. S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a). The measure authorized President Bush
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against
the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

Id.
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decisively. The American people expect it, and they will accept nothing
less. . . . The world has changed, and we are acting appropriately.”19
While the resolution allowed for force in finding and punishing the
perpetrators and sponsors of 9/11, it did not authorize the President to
use force against anyone who might be considering future acts of
terrorism, nor did it encompass how the President may bolster U.S.
intelligence.20 Rather, it was a landmark act passed in the wake of 9/11
that specifically called for broader tracking measures, giving officials
greater authority to trace and intercept communications for law enforcement
and foreign intelligence purposes.21 The often chastised Patriot Act,22
signed into law on October 26, 2001, permits government agencies to
gather information on individuals within the United States “through
enhanced intelligence surveillance procedures, limited judicial oversight
of telephone and internet surveillance, and the ability of law enforcement
to delay notice of search warrants.”23
19. See Congress Approves Resolution Authorizing Force, CNN.COM/U.S. (Sept.
15, 2001), at http://www.CNN.com/2001/US/09/15/congress.terrorism/index.html.
20. See Abramowitz, supra note 17, at 73 & n.7 (citing Alan Fram, Associated
Press, Bush Anti-Terror Aid Request Doubled (Sept. 13, 2001)) (reporting that some
lawmakers opposed earlier resolution language that approved President Bush to “deter
and pre-empt any related future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States”
because that “would have gone too far in eliminating Congress’ role in future
incidents”).
21. Charles Doyle, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch, Congressional Research
Service (Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf.
22. Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18,
42 & 50 U.S.C.). The Patriot Act is long and complex, amounting to 342 pages in ten
parts, amending over fifteen different statutes, and covering a variety of subjects from
immigration, to money laundering, to surveillance, to assisting victims of terrorism.
EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that Relate to Online Activities,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 31, 2001), at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/
Terrorism_ militias/20011031_eff_usa_patriot_analysis.php; see also John W. Whitehead
& Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for “Homeland Security”: A
Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s AntiTerrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2002). Upon signing the Patriot
Act, President Bush emphasized: “As of today, we’re changing the laws governing
information-sharing. And as importantly, we’re changing the culture of our various
agencies that fight terrorism. Countering and investigating terrorist activity is the
number one priority for both law enforcement and intelligence agencies.” President
George W. Bush, Remarks at the White House Signing of the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001 (Oct. 26, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/
bush_terrorismbill.html. Bush also noted: “The bill before me takes account of the new
realities and dangers posed by modern terrorists. It will help law enforcement to
identify, to dismantle, to disrupt, and to punish terrorists before they strike.” Id. For a
firsthand account of America’s response to 9/11 through the lives of various people on
the front lines, including Attorney General John Ashcroft’s personal excursion during the
creation of the Patriot Act, see STEVEN BRILL, AFTER: HOW AMERICA CONFRONTED THE
SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 14 (2003).
23. Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 963 (2002) (citing Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
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Numerous judicial scholars and political activists alike argue that the
Patriot Act articulates politicians’ desperate attempts to give Americans
a quick fix, thereby unduly sacrificing citizens’ rights of privacy and
providing the executive branch with an overreaching power not subject
to any meaningful check or balance.24 Accordingly, critics tab the Patriot
Act as a “rush job” not having been carefully studied by Congress,25
proceeding at a “‘blistering pace’ despite containing several controversial

107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 42 & 50 U.S.C.)). Evans
argues that the Patriot Act potentially violates guaranteed Fourth Amendment
protections. Id. at 974. As explained by CNN, major provisions of the Patriot Act
include authorizing “roving wiretaps” in order for law enforcement to wiretap any
phone, especially cellular and disposable phones, that a suspected terrorist would use;
permitting “the federal government to detain non-U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism for
up to seven days without specific charges” (the Bush Administration originally hoped to
detain them indefinitely); granting “law enforcement officials greater subpoena power
for e-mail records of terrorist suspects”; and “[e]xpanding measures against money
laundering by requiring additional record keeping and reports for certain transactions and
requiring identification of account holders.” See Explaining the U.S.A. Patriot Act,
CNN.COM (Aug. 23, 2002), at http://www.CNN.com/2002/LAW/08/23/patriot.act.explainer.
24. Michael F. Dowley, Note, Government Surveillance Powers Under the USA
PATRIOT Act: Is It Possible to Protect National Security and Privacy at the Same Time?
A Constitutional Tug-of-War, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 165, 165 (2002) (footnotes
omitted). Many of these checks and balances that the Patriot Act eliminates were
implemented after both domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies abused their
surveillance power, including the 1974 revelation that the FBI had spied on over ten
thousand U.S. citizens including Martin Luther King, Jr. EFF Analysis of the Provisions
of the USA Patriot Act that Relate to Online Activities, supra note 22. Now, with the
advent of the latest antiterrorism legislation, “two out of three branches of the federal
government are also being left out of the loop in a growing number of circumstances.”
Susan Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the US Department of Justice: Losing Our
Balances?, JURIST (Dec. 3, 2001), at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew40.htm.
25. EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA Patriot Act that Relate to Online
Activities, supra note 22; see Evans, supra note 23, at 985; see also Nat Hentoff,
Terrorizing the Bill of Rights: “Why Should We Care? It’s Only the Constitution,”
VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 20, 2001, at 32 (describing Wisconsin Congressman David Obey’s
reaction to the Patriot Act as “a backroom quick fix,” and sarcastically noting: “It’s only
the Constitution [at stake]”), available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0146/
hentoff.php (2001); George A. Lyden, Note, The International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001: Congress Wears a Blindfold While
Giving Money Laundering Legislation a Facelift, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 201,
202 (2003) (noting that the Patriot Act was “rammed through Congress” as “one of the
‘swiftest-moving bills in federal history’”) (footnote omitted). The Patriot Act “was
introduced in the House of Representatives on October 23, 2001,” and “[p]ursuant to a
rule waiver, it was passed the next day by a vote of 357-to-66.” Whitehead & Aden,
supra note 22, at 1087 n.26. The Senate then approved the Patriot Act “without
amendment by a vote of 98-to-1 on October 26th,” the same day President Bush signed it
into law. Id.
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criminal provisions that Congress had rejected in previous years.”26
Complainants claim it impacts the lives of innocent Americans rather
than those of hostile terrorists,27 successfully doing so while sneaking
past the awareness, or lack thereof, of average law-abiding citizens by
masking itself as primarily relating to foreign nationals and focusing on
terrorism.28 As a result, the Patriot Act has been attacked for containing
provisions that, in reality, have little to do with terrorism and more to do
with satisfying an FBI surveillance “wish list” that includes intrusive
techniques such as snooping in on people’s computer use and meddling
with individual medical records.29
26. Regina Germain, Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the
USA Patriot Act for Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 505 (2002) (citing
Jonathan Lancaster, Anti-Terrorism Bill Is Approved; Bush Cheers House’s Quick
Action, But Civil Liberties Advocates Are Alarmed, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2001, at A1)
(discussing generally how the Patriot Act is likely to affect asylum adjudications). In an
October 12, 2001 address, the lone dissenting voter in the Senate, Senator Russell
Feingold (D-Wis.), stated the following:
It is one thing to shortcut the legislative process in order to get federal financial
aid to the cities hit by terrorism. We did that, and no one complained that we
moved too quickly. It is quite another to press for the enactment of sweeping
new powers for law enforcement that directly affect the civil liberties of the
American people without due deliberation by the peoples’ elected representatives.
Senator Russell Feingold, On Opposing the U.S.A. Patriot Act, Address to the
Associated Press Managing Editors Conference (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.
archipelago.org/vol6-2/feingold.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
27. Anne Uyeda, The USA Patriot Act May Infringe on Civil Liberties in
Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. NOTES 1 (noting that with the existence of the
Patriot Act, “many Americans should become cautious about the terms they type into
their search engines”) at http://www.lawtechjournal.com/notes/2002/01_020204_uyeda.php
(last visited Feb. 26, 2004); see Whitehead & Aden, supra note 22, at 1083 (“Americans’
liberties have been trammeled in a variety of different ways.”); see also Gore Accuses
Bush of Undermining Freedoms, CNN.COM (Nov. 9, 2003) (“[Former Vice President Al
Gore] called for a repeal of most of the USA Patriot Act, saying its few useful provisions
are far outweighed by those [Gore] said are impinging on American freedoms.”), at
http://www.CNN.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/11/09/gore.bush/index.html.
28. Jennifer Van Bergen, Repeal the USA Patriot Act, Truthout, Part I (Apr. 1,
2002), at http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/04.02A.JVB.Patriot.htm.
29. Hentoff, supra note 25; see Feingold, supra note 26; see also Michael Isikoff,
Show Me the Money, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 2003, at 36 (reporting on the federal
government’s use of the money laundering provision in the Patriot Act to investigate the
records of three Las Vegas officials accused of accepting bribes from the city’s largest
strip club owner Michael Galardi—in 2003, the “Feds have used the Patriot Act to
conduct searches on 962 suspects, yielding ‘hits’ on 6,397 financial records. Of those,
two thirds (4,261) were in money-laundering cases with no apparent terror connection.”).
But see Justice Document: Patriot Act Provision Never Used, CNN.COM (Sept. 17, 2003)
(reporting that section 215 of the Patriot Act, criticized for allowing the FBI under secret
court order to seize tangible items such as business records from any private business,
including hospitals and libraries, has actually never been utilized according to the
Justice Department), at http://www.CNN.com/2003/LAW/09/17/ashcroft.patriot.
One answer to the allegation that the Patriot Act strips away civil liberties is that because
the Attorney General retains a great amount of discretion in exercising the powers
provided therein, the Patriot Act is not so severe. Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot
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Critics suggest that the government has taken full advantage of a
national crisis, capitalizing on 9/11 to substantiate long desired executive
powers previously viewed as “politically unacceptable in peacetime.”30
Even harsher reactions are assured when the Bush Administration
attempts to inconspicuously finalize its bold and more comprehensive
sequel legislation to the Patriot Act, entitled the “Domestic Security
Enhancement Act of 2003”31 or “Patriot Act II.” The proposed legislation,
if passed, would further expand law enforcement’s authority to gather
intelligence, sanctions the use of secret arrests, and seeks to seize U.S.
citizenship status from persons who belong to or support disfavored
political groups.32 Opponents contend that the proposal goes so far as to
Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 451–52 (2002). Thus, although some provisions may
allow the executive branch to, for example, deport a non-U.S. citizen who donates
coloring books to a terrorist organization, the resulting action is not always automatic.
See id. Mitigating interests may factor into the administration’s use of its newly
delegated powers, such as public policy, and it is up to the courts and Congress to
remedy any abuses. Id. For an argument that the Patriot Act does not “expand law
enforcement powers dramatically,” see Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the
USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 608–09 (2003)
(explaining how conventional wisdom regarding the Patriot Act “misses the mark”).
30. McCarthy, supra note 29, at 451 & n.117 (citing Administration’s Draft AntiTerrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
57 (2001) (statement of Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.)) (alleging that “law enforcement urged
swift passage as a means of taking ‘advantage of what is obviously an emergency
situation to obtain authorities that it has been unable to obtain previously’”) (quoting
Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.)); see also Feingold, supra note 26 (noting that a certain proposal,
relating to criminal forfeiture laws, within the Patriot Act “was simply an effort on the
part of the [Justice] Department to take advantage of the emergency situation and get
something that they’ve wanted to get for a long time”).
31. The Center for Public Integrity in Washington, D.C. obtained a copy of an
undisclosed draft, dated January 9, 2003, of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of
2003 and made it available in full text. See Charles Lewis & Adam Mayle, The Center
for Public Integrity, Justice Dept. Drafts Sweeping Expansion of Anti-Terrorism Act, at
http://publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportID=502&L1=10&L2=10&L3=0&L4=0&
L5=0 (Feb. 7, 2003). The Justice Department has not officially released the bill. Even if
“[i]t would be premature to speculate on any future decisions,” it is rumored that the bill
expands law enforcement privileges and creates a “substantial new terrorist identification
database.” Id.; see Will There Be a Patriot Act Part II?, PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP., Feb.
2003, at 2; see also Rupal Shah, Administration Drafts “Patriot Act II,” Activists
Concerned, INDIA-W., Feb. 28, 2003, at A26 (discussing how the Patriot Act II is already
drawing stiff opposition).
32. Lewis & Mayle, supra note 31. The Justice Department may already conceal
the names of hundreds of foreigners detained after 9/11, despite the cries of more than
twenty civil liberties groups invoking the Freedom of Information Act, a law requiring
disclosure of certain government files. Smita Nordwall, Ruling Favors U.S. on 9/11
Detainees, USA TODAY, June 18, 2003, at 5A. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, by a two-to-one vote, held that disclosing the names of detainees may “give
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subject an antiwar protestor to the death penalty if the protestor breaks
the law during a demonstration resulting in someone’s death.33 Once
terrorists insight into the government’s Sept. 11 investigation” and that federal judges,
when asked to compel disclosures, should defer to the Bush Administration’s concerns
that such disclosures assist the “nation’s enemies.” Id. The majority wrote: “Disclosure
would inform terrorists of both the substantive and geographic focus of the investigation.
Moreover, disclosure would inform terrorists which of their members were compromised
by the investigation, and which were not.” Mark J. Prendergast, Names of 9/11
Detainees Can Remain Secret, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003 (quoting Ctr. for
Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). In
dissent, Judge David S. Tatel noted that disclosure would allow the public to determine
whether the government abused “one of its most awesome powers,” the power to “arrest
and jail.” Id. (Tatel, J. dissenting) (citing Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 937–38).
The public may then determine particularly whether individuals were detained solely
because of their religion and ethnicity and for long periods of time without
communication with legal counsel. Id. Attorney General John Ashcroft responded: “We
are pleased the court agreed we should not give terrorists a virtual road map to our
investigation that could allow terrorists to chart a potentially deadly detour around our
efforts.” Id.
33. E.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Says New
Ashcroft Bill Erodes Checks and Balances on Presidential Power; Patriot II Legislation
Would Needlessly Infringe on Basic Constitutional Liberties (Feb. 12, 2003), available
at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11817&c=206 (citing § 411).
As portrayed by the ACLU, the new legislation, if passed into law, would:
Make it easier for the government to initiate surveillance and wiretapping of
U.S. citizens under the shadowy, top-secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. (Sections 101, 102 and 107)
Shelter federal agents engaged in illegal surveillance without a court order
from criminal prosecution if they are following orders of high Executive
Branch officials. (Section 106)
Authorize, in statute, the Department of Justice’s campaign of secret detentions
by including a provision that would preempt federal litigation challenging nondisclosure of basic information about detainees. (Section 201)
Threaten public health by severely restricting access to crucial information
about environmental health risks posed by facilities that use dangerous
chemicals. (Section 202)
Harm Americans’ ability to receive a fair trial by limiting defense attorneys
from challenging the use of secret evidence. (Section 204)
Reduce the ability of grand jury witnesses in terrorism investigations to defend
themselves against public accusations by gagging them from discussing their
testimony with the media or the general public. (Section 206)
Allow for the sampling and cataloguing of innocent Americans’ genetic
information without court order and without consent. (Sections 301–306)
Permit, without any connection to anti-terrorism efforts, sensitive personal
information about U.S. citizens to be shared with local and state law
enforcement. (Section 311)
Undercut trust between police departments and immigrant communities by
opening sensitive visa files to local police for the enforcement of complex
immigration laws. (Section 311)
Terminate court-approved limits on police spying, which were initially put in
place to prevent McCarthy-style law enforcement persecution based on
political or religious affiliation. (Section 312)
Provide an incentive for neighbor to spy on neighbor and pose problems
similar to those inherent in Attorney General Ashcroft’s “Operation TIPS” by
granting blanket immunity to businesses that phone in false terrorism tips, even
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again, discontent has arisen over the lack of review by Congress in the
face of such broad legislation.34
The political climate since 9/11 continues to revolve around the fiery
debate between civil libertarians, stoutly protesting against the abridgement
of any constitutional right, and the legislature,35 filled with alacrity and
motivated by a ubiquitous fear of repeat terrorism. New surveillance
programs such as the aviation industry’s Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System II (CAPPS II),36 which is designed to scan public
and private databases for information on individuals traveling to and
from the United States in order to designate passengers as potential
security threats, only add fuel to the fire.37 The government clearly

Id.

if their actions are taken with reckless disregard for the truth. (Section 313)
Further criminalize association—without any intent to commit acts of
terrorism—with unpopular organizations labeled as terrorist by our government.
(Section 402)
Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, unfairly target undocumented workers
with extended jail terms for common immigration offenses. (Section 502)
Provide for summary deportations without evidence of crime or criminal
intent, even of lawful permanent residents, whom the Attorney General says
are a threat to national security. (Section 503)
Abolish fair hearings for lawful permanent residents convicted of criminal
offenses through an “expedited removal” procedure, and prevent any court
from questioning the government’s unlawful actions by explicitly exempting
these cases from habeas corpus. Congress has not exempted any person from
habeas corpus—a protection guaranteed by the Constitution—since the Civil
War. (Section 504)

34. See Administration Formulates “Patriot II” with Harsher Immigration
Provisions, 80 NO. 8 INTERPRETER RELEASES 270, 272 (2003).
35. Some lawmakers however, including Republicans, have introduced the
Security and Freedom Ensured Act (SAFE Act), which responds to the Patriot Act’s
threats to civil rights. See Ashcroft Warns of Bush Veto on Scaled-Back Patriot Bill,
CNN.COM (Jan. 29, 2004), at http://www.CNN.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/patriot.act.ap.
The SAFE Act, if passed, would “impose expiration dates on nationwide search warrants
and other Patriot Act provisions.” Id. The SAFE Act has yet to reach a hearing in either
branch of Congress, yet Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an advance warning,
stating that passing the proposed legislation would “undermine our ongoing campaign to
detect and prevent catastrophic terrorist attacks.” Id.
36. See Elliot Borin, Private Info Becoming Plane Truth, WIRED NEWS (Sept. 16,
2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,55037,00.html. Called the “nation’s
largest domestic surveillance system,” the CAPPS II program may be extended to screen
individuals in other methods of transportation that involve the public’s trust, including
truckers, railroad conductors, and subway workers. Robert O’Harrow Jr., Air Security
Focusing on Flier Screening, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2002, at A1.
37. The ACLU reports that the types of information collected by the CAPPS II
program may include “financial and transactional data,” credit card purchases, housing
information, communications records, health records, and legal records. Press Release,
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wishes to push its policies forward to fight terror,38 even at the risk of
passing overinclusive39 reform, despite public demonstrations of dissent
and plain ignorance.
III. THE AEDPA OF 1996
A. At Issue: Prohibiting Material Support to Designated Foreign
Terrorist Organizations
The Patriot Act is not the legislature’s first attempt at combating
international and domestic terrorism.40 In one of its previous efforts,
responding to the 1993 World Trade Center41 and 1995 Oklahoma City
bombings,42 a bipartisan Congress introduced43 the AEDPA.44 Signed
American Civil Liberties Union, CAPPS II Data-Mining System Will Invade Privacy
and Create Government Blacklist of Americans, ACLU Warns (Feb. 27, 2003), at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=11956&c=130. ACLU legislative counsel Katie
Corrigan claims that once CAPPS II determines that an individual is a security threat, the
program does not allow the suspect to review the information on which the decision was
based or permit the suspect to appeal the designation. See id. Director of the ACLU’s
Technology and Liberty Program Barry Steinhardt adds, “Nothing like [CAPPS II] has
ever been done in this country.” Id.
38. On June 5, 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft urged Congress to expand
the Patriot Act’s powers, including increasing the number of federal terror-related crimes
punishable by life sentences or the death penalty. Richard B. Schmitt, Stiffer Terror
Laws Urged, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2003, at A1. Ashcroft also sought to deny bail entirely
to suspected terrorists. Id.
39. One proposed explanation as to why many of the new powers implemented by
the Patriot Act seem to extend beyond terrorism is because “legislators simply lacked the
time and opportunity to develop complex, nuanced definitions that would be neither
over-inclusive nor under-inclusive.” McCarthy, supra note 29, at 451. Thus, due to the
perceived threat to the country not only from 9/11 but also from the subsequent anthrax
contamination and pressure from the Bush Administration, Congress “erred on the side
of over-inclusiveness.”
Id.
For more information on the post-9/11 anthrax
investigations, see Confirmed Anthrax Cases, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2001, at A8.
40. For a brief discussion on past antiterrorism laws with surveillance
implications, including Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (OCCSSA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), see
Evans, supra note 23, at 952–58.
41. On February 26, 1993, six people were killed and a thousand others were
injured when a truck carrying a twelve hundred-pound bomb was detonated in the World
Trade Center’s parking garage. On November 12, 1997, after three days of deliberation,
a federal jury convicted Ramzi Yousef, then twenty-nine years old, and Eyad Ismoil,
then twenty-six, on murder and conspiracy charges for their roles in the Islamic
extremists’ plot to bomb the Trade Center. Yousef was one of the ringleaders, while
Ismoil was accused of driving the truck into the parking garage. After the attack, both
fled from the United States on commercial airline flights, only to be captured in 1995.
The attack “brought home to the American public their possible vulnerability to Middle
Eastern terrorism.” Jury Convicts 2 in Trade Center Blast, CNN.COM (Nov. 12, 1997), at
http://www.CNN.com/US/9711/12/world.trade.center/index.html.
42. On April 19, 1995, 168 people, including nineteen children, were killed and
850 others were injured in the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil until 9/11, when a
massive bomb inside a rental truck exploded in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal

850

AGARWAL.DOC

[VOL. 41: 839, 2004]

9/17/2019 11:04 AM

Obstructing Justice
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

into law by President Clinton on April 24, 1996,45 the AEDPA principally
Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Whidden, supra note 12, at 2825; Evans, supra
note 23, at 933 n.2 (citing Oklahoma City Tragedy: The Bombing, CNN.COM, at
http://www.CNN.com/US/OKC/bombing.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2003)). Timothy
McVeigh, “an extremist who wrote of making blood flow in the streets of America . . .
was found guilty of eight counts of capital murder . . . one count of conspiracy to use a
weapon of mass destruction, one count of actually using that weapon and one count of
destruction by explosive.” McVeigh Guilty, CNN.COM (June 2, 1997), at http://www.CNN.
com/US/9706/02/mcveigh.verdict/index.html. McVeigh was executed by lethal injection
on June 11, 2001 in the first federal execution since 1963. Timothy McVeigh Dead,
CNN.com/LAW CENTER (June 11, 2001), at http://www.CNN.com/2001/LAW/ 06/11/
mcveigh.01/index.html. Terry Nichols was also convicted for his role in the Oklahoma
City bombing, sentenced to life imprisonment, and ordered to pay the government $14
million for the damages caused to the federal building. See Evans, supra note 23, at 933
n.2 (citing Nichols Gets Life for Oklahoma Bombing, CNN.COM (June 4, 1998), at
http://www.CNN.com/US/ 9703/okc.trial/nichols.sentence/index.html).
43. Legislators responded to “give law enforcement the tools it needs to do
everything possible to prevent [a tragedy like the Oklahoma City bombing] from
happening again.” Whidden, supra note 12, at 2825 n.4 (citing Presidential Statement
on Senate Passage of Antiterrorism Legislation, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 993
(June 7, 1995)). The response was not immediate however, as the House did not endorse
the bill introduced by the Senate in June 1995 “until almost one year after the bombing.”
Evans, supra note 23, at 958 n.163 (citing William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive
Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 107 (2000)).
44. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214–1319 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 28, 40 & 42 U.S.C.). The AEDPA consists of nine titles covering
“areas such as justice for victims, habeas corpus reform, international terrorism
prohibitions, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons restrictions, implementation of
plastic explosives convention, terrorist and criminal alien removal and exclusion,
criminal-law modifications to counter terrorism, and assistance to law enforcement.”
Roberto Iraola, Due Process, Judicial Review, the First Amendment, and the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 78 N.D. L. REV. 1, 5 n.28 (2002)
(citing Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214–17). Although the AEDPA has been
described as a “first-stage preemptive approach to combating terrorism,” the purpose of
the AEDPA is to “deter terrorism.” Id. at 5 (citing Stephen C. Warneck, Note, A
Preemptive Strike: Using RICO and the AEDPA to Attack the Financial Strength of
International Terrorist Organizations, 78 B.U. L. REV. 177, 179 (1998)). Warneck
concludes that the AEDPA affects, and advocates how it attacks, the “underlying
financial structures of terrorist organizations.” Warneck, supra, at 182. The Center for
National Security Studies, however, has called the AEDPA “a major blow to the Bill of
Rights” that “represents the worst setback for civil liberties in many years.” Center for
National Security Studies, Terrorism Law Is Major Setback for Civil Liberties, at
http://www.cdt.org/policy/terrorism/cnss_habeas.html (June 20, 1996). The AEDPA has
also been called the “direct antecedent” of the Patriot Act. Emanuel Gross, The
Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States: The Aftermath of
September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 15 (2002) (noting, however,
that the Patriot Act is “more far reaching than the AEDPA in terms of the powers granted
to the enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, and the extent to which [these
powers] violate human rights”).
45. The Clinton Administration considered the prior “anti-terrorism laws to be ‘a
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consists of stronger immigration laws through amendment of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.46
At issue in this Comment is how the AEDPA fights terrorism by
prohibiting persons from knowingly providing “material support or
resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations.”47 Specifically,
confusing patchwork of measures’” and thus decided “to take an even tougher stance
against terrorism.” Roberta Smith, Note, America Tries to Come to Terms with
Terrorism: The United States Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v.
British Anti-Terrorism Law and International Response, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
249, 261 (1997) (footnotes omitted). Not included in the AEDPA, however, were
provisions sponsored by Clinton that would have enhanced “wiretapping capabilities of
all telephones used by suspected terrorists” and granted the government access to
terrorists’ records, including consumer credit reports. Id. at 269. In response to
increased terrorist acts on Americans, the Clinton Administration had drafted the
Omnibus Counterterrorism Act in February 1995, two months before the bombing in
Oklahoma City, to, among other things, “provide clear Federal criminal jurisdiction for
any international terrorist attack that might occur in the United States.” Id. at 260–61
(quoting President’s Message to Congress Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, 31
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 227 (Feb. 9, 1995)). President Clinton expanded the bill
soon after the Oklahoma City incident and urged quick action from the Senate. Jennifer
A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 694–95 (1998) (discussing
the constitutionality of the AEDPA in its beginning stages). For a criticism of different
components of the initially drafted Omnibus Act, see Center for National Security
Studies, Clinton Terrorism Legislation Threatens Constitutional Rights, at http://www.
cdt.org/policy/terrorism/cnss.cti.anal.html (Apr. 26, 1995).
46. See Evans, supra note 23, at 958 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1251–59 (2000)).
One of the more controversial provisions, AEDPA § 440(d), disallows legal aliens
convicted of certain enumerated crimes from obtaining waivers of deportation. See
AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 28, 42 & 50 U.S.C.). See generally Anjali Parekh Prakash, Note,
Changing the Rules: Arguing Against Retroactive Application of Deportation Statutes,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1423 (1997) (noting that § 440(d) “may deprive a permanent
resident of discretionary relief and thus attach a new legal consequence of automatic
deportation to certain criminal convictions”). The resulting automatic deportation sets
forth a larger class of individuals, albeit those with criminal records, that are denied the
chance to plead their cases before a possibly sympathetic immigration judge. See id. at
1421. President Clinton publicly opposed the AEDPA’s immigration provisions as he
signed the legislation, “calling them ‘ill-advised’ and stating that they ‘reach beyond the
scope of counter terrorism efforts.’” Lisa C. Solbakken, Note, The Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act: Anti-Immigration Legislation Veiled in an Anti-Terrorism
Pretext, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1381 n.4 (1997) (citation omitted) (discussing
generally how the AEDPA effects constitutional rights traditionally afforded to legal
aliens); see also President’s Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719, 721 (Apr. 24, 1996). Even the
Patriot Act, often criticized for expanding previous antiterrorism laws, cut back on one
AEDPA immigration provision that mandated detention for those seeking asylum until
their claims were adjudicated. McCarthy, supra note 29, at 448. The Patriot Act
presently “authorizes detention for only seven days, after which the government must
bring immigration or criminal charges.” Id. at 449 (footnote omitted).
47. See generally Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. I 2001)). The section sets forth unlawful conduct as
follows:
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the AEDPA authorizes the Secretary of State (Secretary), in consultation
with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury,48 to
designate an organization as a “foreign terrorist organization” if the
Secretary finds the following: (A) The organization is a foreign
organization,49 (B) the organization engages in terrorist activity,50 and
Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
Id. The Patriot Act “also aims to stop terrorism by disrupting terrorist financial networks
through Title III of the Act, the International Money Laundering and Abatement and
Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001.” McCarthy, supra note 29, at 446–47 (citing §
301, 115 Stat. at 296). The money laundering provisions of the Patriot Act mandate that
banks and other financial institutions keep an eye on “account activity and . . . report
suspicious transactions.” Id. at 448.
48. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 302, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1189(c)(4) (2000)). The term “Secretary,” as used in the statute, “means the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.” Id.
49. Neither the AEDPA nor the entire United States Code defines the term “foreign
organization.” Joshua A. Ellis, Note, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under
the AEDPA: The National Council Court Erred in Requiring Pre-Designation Process,
2002 BYU L. REV. 675, 679. However, “a few unrelated sections of the Code of Federal
Regulations,” including 12 C.F.R. § 347.102(k) (2001), do include a definition of
“foreign organization” as “‘an organization that is organized under the laws of a foreign
country.’” Ellis, supra, at 679 n.26. The Patriot Act amends the definition of “terrorist
organization,” expanding it to mean “any group that engages in violence or destruction
of property.” McCarthy, supra note 29, at 450 (citing Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411, 115
Stat. at 346–48). Opponents of this definition remain unsatisfied, claiming that it is not
limited to foreign or international groups, encompassing even “advocacy groups causing
minor property damage during an act of civil disobedience.” Id.
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (Supp. I 2001). Generally, “terrorist activity”
includes the following acts, or the threat, attempt, or conspiracy to engage in: (i)
hijacking or sabotaging an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle; (ii) seizing, detaining, or
threatening to kill an individual in order to compel a third person (including a
government organization) to do or abstain from doing an act; (iii) attacking an
internationally protected person; (iv) engaging in an assassination; and (v) using
biological or chemical agents, nuclear weapons, explosives, or firearms with the intent to
endanger others or damage property. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)–(V).
An organization engages in terrorist activity when it commits or incites another to
commit a terrorist activity, when it prepares or plans a terrorist activity, when it
“gather[s] information on potential targets for terrorist activity,” when it solicits funds
for a terrorist activity or another terrorist organization, or when it solicits an individual to
engage in a terrorist activity or to become a member of a terrorist organization. Id. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)–(V). Thus, the statute provides that a donor has to know or have
reason to believe that the individual to whom he was providing support has committed or
planned to commit a terrorist activity. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb). Furthermore, an
organization engages in terrorist activity when it provides material support “for the
commission of a terrorist activity” or “to a terrorist organization.” Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
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(C) the organization’s terrorist activity threatens the security of U.S.
nationals or the national security51 of the United States.52 In designating a
foreign terrorist organization, the Secretary may consider classified
information53 and must create an administrative record with supporting
facts.54
Designation results in dire consequences. Funds that the designated
organization has on deposit with any financial institution in the United
States may be blocked in future transactions.55 Representatives and
certain members of the organization are consequently barred from
entering the United States.56 Most importantly, AEDPA § 2339B forbids
all persons within or subject to U.S. jurisdiction from “knowingly
Amended by the Patriot Act, the definition of “terrorist activity” now includes a
“catch-all provision,” which defines such activity as the use of “any weapon or
dangerous device,” not merely limited to those listed previously. See Germain, supra
note 26, at 518 (citing Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a)(1)(E), 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified
at INA § 212 (a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b))). The only limitation on this definition “is that the use
of the weapon must not be for ‘mere personal monetary gain’ and that the individual
must have the ‘intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.’” Id. (citing § 411 (codified at
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI))).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (Supp. I 2001). The statute defines the term “national
security” as the “national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2) (2000). National security may be threatened not only
domestically but also by “threats to U.S. nationals or U.S. interests abroad.” Ellis, supra
note 49, at 682 (footnote omitted).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (Supp. I 2001). The antiterrorism provisions of the
AEDPA were designed to “provide the Federal Government the fullest possible basis,
consistent with the Constitution, to prevent persons within the United States, or subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material support or resources to
foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities.” Iraola, supra note 44, at 5–6
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(3)(B) (Supp. I 2001). Classified information may not be
disclosed so long as it remains classified, but “such information may be disclosed to a
court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review under Section 1189(b).” Id.
Section 1189(c)(1) provides that the term “classified information” “has the meaning given to
that term in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act,” which defines
“classified information” as “any information or material that has been determined by the
United States Government pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to
require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security.”
Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1998)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 3).
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(3)(A) (2000).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (Supp. I 2001); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2)
(2000). The Secretary of the Treasury may freeze any assets that the organization has on
deposit with any financial institution in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C); see
also 31 C.F.R. § 597.302 (2001) (defining assets); id. § 597.319(a) (defining “U.S.
financial institution” in part as “[a]ny financial institution organized under the laws of
the United States, including such financial institution’s foreign branches”). These assets
remain frozen “until further directive from either the Secretary of the Treasury, Act of
Congress, or order of court.” 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C); see also 31 C.F.R. § 597.201(b).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A) (2000).
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provid[ing] material support or resources” to the organization.57 Under
the AEDPA, the provider of material support has to know or have reason
to know that any individual to which the contributor provided support
has committed or planned to commit a terrorist activity, but this
knowledge is not required when the provider donates to a terrorist
organization.58 Violation results in a fine, may lead to imprisonment for
up to fifteen years or longer if the violation results in “the death of any
person,” or both.59
Prior to filing a designation, the Secretary, by classified communication,
must in writing notify several specified high ranking members of Congress
of the intent to designate a certain entity as a foreign terrorist
organization, together with supplying findings and the factual basis that
support the designation.60 Seven days thereafter, the Secretary must
publish the designation in the Federal Register.61 The designation is
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (Supp. I 2001). The statute defines “material support or
resources” as “currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or
religious materials.” Id. § 2339A(b). It has been held that “two of the components
included within the definition of material support, ‘training’ and ‘personnel,’ were
impermissibly vague,” thereby “enjoin[ing] the prosecution of [people] for activities
covered by these terms.” Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2000); see infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the viability of the AEDPA through the
void-for-vagueness doctrine). The term “expert advice or assistance” has also been held
unconstitutionally vague. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV 03-6107 ABC
(MCx), 2004 WL 547534, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2004).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (Supp. I 2001) (amended by the Patriot Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), 115 Stat. 272). The AEDPA did not originally
make this distinction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000). The current law now
prohibits a contributor who provides material support to a terrorist organization,
“regardless of whether [the provider] has knowledge that its members have committed or
plan to commit a terrorist activity,” subject to two exceptions. Germain, supra note 26,
at 519 (citing Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), 115 Stat. 272 (codified at INA § 212(a)(3)
(B)(iv)(VI))). The first “applies if the provider gave to a group that has not been
officially designated as a terrorist organization and if he can demonstrate that he did not
know and should not reasonably have known that his act would further the
organization’s terrorist activity.” Id. The second “applies if the Secretary of State and
Attorney General, in their unreviewable discretion, determine that the clause should not
apply.” Id.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (Supp. I 2001).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i). The congressional leaders to be notified are “the
Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, the President pro
tempore, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader of the Senate, and the members of the
relevant [congressional] committees.” Id.
61. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii).
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effective for a period of two years62 and is only renewable by the
Secretary, provided that the relevant circumstances that led to the initial
designation still exist.63 Congress, however, may block or subsequently
revoke a designation.64 The Secretary may also choose to revoke a
designation depending on whether changed circumstances or the national
security of the United States warrants such action.65 Nonetheless, the
revocation of a designation does “not affect any action or proceeding
based on conduct committed prior to the effective date of such
revocation.”66
For the purposes of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, designation
takes effect immediately upon publication in the Federal Register.67
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(A) (2000). Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations
have designated foreign terrorist organizations under the AEDPA scheme. See Iraola,
supra note 44, at 8. Thirty organizations formed the first-ever set of designations, made
by former Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright on October 2, 1997. Id. (citing
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650–51 (Oct. 8,
1997)). “On October 8, 1999, Secretary Albright redesignated twenty-seven groups, and
added al-Qa’ida, the terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden” believed to be
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. Id.
(citing Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112, 55,112–13
(Oct. 8, 1999) (designating “al Qaeda” for the first time)). Secretary Albright designated
one additional organization on September 25, 2000. Id. (citing Designation of a Foreign
Terrorist Organization, 65 Fed. Reg. 57,641, 57,641–49 (Sept. 25, 2000) (designating the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan)).
The Bush Administration has also been engaged in designating foreign terrorist
organizations. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell designated a new organization and
renewed twenty-four others on October 5, 2001. Id. (citing Redesignation of Foreign
Terrorist Organization, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088, 51,088–90 (Oct. 5, 2001)). Also “on
December 26, 2001 and March 27, 2002, Secretary Powell designated five additional
groups as terrorist organizations, including two Pakistani groups and a group linked to
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s party.” Id. (citing Press Release, Colin L. Powell,
Secretary of State, Statement on Designation of Three Additional Terrorist Organizations
(Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/9017.htm). As of
May 23, 2003, thirty-six groups had been designated as foreign terrorist organizations, as
indicated in a State Department fact sheet. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF
COUNTERTERRORISM, FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (May 23, 2003), available
at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2003/12389.htm. On October 2, 2003, twenty-five
organizations were redesignated, including “al-Qa’ida.” Redesignation of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,860–02 (Oct. 2, 2003).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B) (Supp. I 2001). The Secretary may renew
designation for an additional two-year period at the end of the two-year period referred
to in § 1189(a)(4)(A), “but not sooner than 60 days prior to the termination of such
period.” Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B). In addition, “[a]ny redesignation shall be effective
immediately following the end of the prior [two]-year designation or redesignation
period unless a different effective date is provided in such redesignation.” Id.
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(5) (2000).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(6)(A)(i)–(ii) (Supp. I 2001).
66. Id. § 1189(a)(7).
67. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(B)(i). Either designation or redesignation precludes a defendant in
a criminal action from raising any question concerning the validity of the designation “as
a defense or an objection at any trial or hearing.” Id. § 1189(a)(8).
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Within thirty days, a designated organization may seek judicial review68
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.69 Generally, the
court must limit its review to the administrative record, yet in ex parte
and in camera review, the court may also consider classified information
used in making the designation.70
On review, the D.C. Circuit must hold unlawful and set aside a
designation that it finds to be:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of
statutory right;
(D) lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or
in classified information submitted to the court . . . or
(E) not in accord with the procedures required by law.71

B. Major Constitutional Victories: The Rise of the AEDPA
The great deference given to the Secretary and the fairly easy
misinterpretation of certain provisions within the AEDPA raise a number of
constitutional questions.72 For example, does the AEDPA violate the First
Amendment? Is it unconstitutionally vague? What level of constitutional
scrutiny should be applied? What procedural due process concerns are
affected by the Secretary’s designation of a foreign terrorist organization?
And, are all of the Secretary’s findings in making the designation subject
to judicial review? The following section of this Comment will address
possible answers to these questions and will track the AEDPA’s rise
in constitutional validity, provided mostly by the Ninth Circuit in
68. The only function of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in reviewing an
order of the Secretary designating an entity as a foreign terrorist organization under the
AEDPA “is to decide if the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information . . .
to come to the conclusion that the organizations were foreign and engaged in terrorism.”
Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(quoting People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir.
1999)). Furthermore, there is no greater function for the appellate court in reviewing a
Secretary’s designation of one such organization as an alias of another. Id.
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1) (2000); see infra Part IV.C.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(2).
71. Id. § 1189(b)(3). The pendency of an action for judicial review does not alter
the effectiveness of the designation, “unless the court issues a final order setting aside
the designation.” Id. § 1189(b)(4).
72. For a more extensive discussion on answers to similar questions, see Iraola,
supra note 44, at 5–22.

857

AGARWAL.DOC

9/17/2019 11:04 AM

Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno.73
1. Under the First Amendment: Guilt by Association
The First Amendment provides the following:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.74

Although the word “association” does not appear in the First Amendment,
freedom of association arises by implication. The Supreme Court has
held that the “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech.”75 Accordingly, opponents claim that the AEDPA
73. 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The following discussion will not, however,
analyze the recent indictments of the following individuals under the AEDPA: (1)
Former University of South Florida computer engineering professor Sami Al-Arian, who
was indicted on February 19, 2003, with three other men, for helping to finance suicide
bombings and other attacks by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel. George C. Harris,
Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National
Security, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 135, 146 n.65 (2003) (book review). For the June 2003
decision on the defendants’ various pretrial motions, see United States v. Al-Arian, 267
F. Supp. 2d 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2003). (2) Earnest James Ujaama, who was indicted in
August 2002 in a Washington federal court for providing material support and resources
to al Qaeda and conspiring to establish a terrorist training camp in rural Oregon. See
Michael J. Kelly, Executive Excess v. Judicial Process: American Judicial Response to
the Government’s War on Terror, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 787, 799 n.38 (2003);
see also Anti-Defamation League, Convictions/Sentencing, TERRORISM UPDATE, July
2003, at 3 (reporting that Ujaama pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a two-year prison
term on April 14, 2003), available at http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/terrorism_update_
32_july2003.pdf. (3) Enaam M. Arnaout, head of the Benevolence International
Foundation, a purportedly international charitable organization, was indicted in 2002 for
providing funds to al Qaeda, Hezb e Islami, Chechen rebels at war with the Russian
army, and other groups involved in violent activities in Chechnya. Associated Press,
Islamic Charity Head Charged With Funneling Funds to Bin Laden, FOXNEWS.COM
(Oct. 9, 2002), at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,65252,00.html. On the morning
of his trial, Arnaout entered a guilty plea to a charge of racketeering fraud conspiracy,
and in exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the material support charge. United
States v. Arnaout, 282 F. Supp. 2d 838, 840 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
75. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (citations
omitted) (“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more
than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of
speech and assembly.”). In other words, “[a]n individual’s freedom to speak, to worship,
and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously
protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group
effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 622 (1984) (citation omitted).
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prohibits individuals from participating in organizations that assist or
support terrorism without explicitly examining the individuals’ purpose
in such involvement, thereby incriminating those who may be supporting
the legal activities of such designated organizations.76 As a result,
criminal defendants have recently attacked the AEDPA on First Amendment
freedom of association grounds, but have not been successful.77
In particular, the district court in United States v. Lindh78 rejected such
a challenge. The defendant, an American citizen, contested a ten count
indictment filed against him under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B79 in February
2002 for allegedly joining “certain foreign terrorist organizations in
Afghanistan and serv[ing] these organizations [overseas while] in
combat against Northern Alliance and American forces until his capture

76. Gross, supra note 44, at 17. Opponents criticize the AEDPA for impeding the
right to financially support one’s chosen group, claiming this violates the essential right
to associate. See, e.g., Whidden, supra note 12, at 2845 (citing David Cole, Hanging
with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP.
CT. REV. 203, 246–50).
77. Iraola, supra note 44, at 16.
78. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002). Defendant John Philip Walker Lindh,
the so-called “American Taliban” fighter, moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that the prejudicial media attention surrounding his case deprived him of his Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial, a request later denied by the court. Id. at 547–51. Lindh
was subsequently sentenced to twenty years in federal prison, see Susan Candiotti,
Walker Lindh Sentenced to 20 Years, CNN.COM (Oct. 4, 2002), at http://www.
CNN.com/2002/LAW/10/04/lindh.statement/index.html, and attacked by a fellow inmate.
See John Walker Lindh Attacked in Prison, CNN.COM (Mar. 6, 2003), at http://www.
CNN.com/2003/US/West/03/06/walker.lindh.prison/index.html. Due to the sentencing,
one commentator proclaimed the following:
So discount the assertions of the naysayers, the pessimists, and the fearful,
that the United States government lacks the resources to deal with people
within our jurisdiction who engage in active or sleeper terrorist activities.
Sections 391 [the federal conspiracy statute] and 2339 are more than up to the
challenge. Rest assured that, thanks to these two statutes, accused domestic
terrorists will fall like tenpins.
Henry Mark Holzer, Terrorists’ Nemesis, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM (Sept. 26, 2002), at
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=3381.
79. Counts two through five had § 2339B implications, charging Lindh with
conspiracy to provide and providing material support and resources to designated foreign
terrorist organizations, namely the Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) (counts two and
three), a terrorist group dedicated to an extremist view in Islam, and al Qaeda (counts
four and five). Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 547; see also Executive Order 13224: Blocking
Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit,
or Support Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,079–83 (Sept. 23, 2001) (listing HUM as
an organization whose “property and interests in property . . . that are in the United
States . . . are blocked”).
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in November 2001.”80 The defendant argued that he had a right to associate
with foreign individuals and groups and that the indictment impermissibly
infringed this right by criminalizing his relationship, resulting in the
government’s imposition of guilt by association.81
The court deemed the argument unfounded, especially because the
defendant crossed the line between First Amendment-protected activities
and constitutionally unprotected criminal conduct.82 In this instance, the
defendant was accused not only of associating with disfavored groups,
but also of joining groups that did more than “merely advocate terror,
violence, and murder of innocents”; these groups actually carried out
their campaigns.83 Therefore, individuals who actively take part in a
terrorist organization’s acts of terror, violence, and murder, at whatever
level, carry out crimes with no constitutional protection.84 Challenges by
these participants are thus struck down.85
The court in Lindh cited its strongest authority in Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno,86 where the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected a similar notion.87
Plaintiffs, comprised of six organizations and two U.S. citizens,88 claimed
80. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 545. The indictment specifically alleged that the
defendant (1) attended a military training camp in Pakistan run by HUM; (2) crossed
from Pakistan into Afghanistan for the purpose of taking up arms with the Taliban; (3)
reported to a Taliban recruiting center in Kabul; (4) attended al Qaeda’s al-Farooq
training camp for military training and personally met with al Qaeda leader Osama bin
Laden; (5) participated in a terrorist training course; (6) completed his training and was
subsequently issued rifles and grenades; (7) traveled with other combatants to the front
line in Takhar (in northeastern Afghanistan) where he opposed Northern Alliance forces;
(8) remained with his fighting group after the United States had entered the conflict and
until the defendant surrendered at Kunduz, Afghanistan; and (9) was among a group of
Taliban prisoners who staged a violent uprising at the Qala-i-Janghi (QIJ) prison that
resulted in the death of an American intelligence agent. Id. at 545–47.
81. Id. at 569.
82. Id. The court summarized the point as follows: “The First Amendment’s
guarantee of associational freedom is no license to supply terrorist organizations with
resources or material support in any form, including services as a combatant. Those who
choose to furnish such material support to terrorists cannot hide or shield their conduct
behind the First Amendment.” Id. at 570.
83. Id. at 569.
84. Id.
85. This statement “finds support in long-standing Supreme Court precedent
upholding the government’s authority to place restrictions or outright bans on dealings
with foreign entities that have acted against United States interests.” Id. at 570. For
example, the Supreme Court has upheld a prohibition on dealings with Cuba, further
holding: “Matters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial
inquiry or interference.’” Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (quoting Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)) (alteration in original).
86. 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
87. Id. at 1133. The court further noted that § 2339B “has teeth” because a
violation leads to punishment by fine, imprisonment, or both. Id. at 1132.
88. Id. at 1133. Named plaintiffs included six organizations—the Humanitarian
Law Project, Ilankai Thamil Sangam, Tamils of Northern California, Tamil Welfare and
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that the AEDPA prohibition violated the long-established rule as set
forth in cases such as NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.89 In order for
liability to be imposed by reason of association alone, the rule deems it
“necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and
that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.”90
Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project argued that
criminalizing their support of two nonviolent humanitarian and political
organizations91 infringed upon their rights of association.92
Human Rights Committee, Federation of Tamil Sangams of North America, World
Tamil Coordinating Committee—and two United States citizens—Ralph Fertig and
Nagalingam Jeyalingam. Id. at 1130. The Center for Constitutional Rights brought the
suit against named defendants Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright, Attorney General
Janet Reno, and the U.S. Departments of Justice and State. Id.; see also Joseph Furst,
III, Comment, Guilt by Association and the AEDPA’s Fundraising Ban, 16 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 475, 486 (1999).
89. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). In Claiborne Hardware, ninety-two petitioners were
found liable for economic damages incurred as a result of a boycott of the respondents’
businesses, owned by white merchants in Claiborne City, Mississippi. Id. at 888–93.
The judgment was reversed on appeal because the majority of the petitioners’ activities
were nonviolent and entitled to protection under the First Amendment, but the Supreme
Court observed that those who took part in an unlawful activity and had further violent
goals could nevertheless be held liable. Id. at 933–34. The Court held: “The right to
associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of the
group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not
protected.” Id. at 908. Thus, absent a showing of specific intent to further unlawful
conduct, the Court concluded that mere association by the petitioners with the boycotting
group was insufficient to predicate liability. Id. at 920.
90. Id. (footnote omitted). Furthermore, to punish association with a group having
both legal and illegal aims, “there must be ‘clear proof that a defendant “specifically
intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to violence.”’” Id. at 919
(citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) and quoting Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)). The government has the burden to establish both the
defendant’s affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful claims and goals and the
defendant’s specific intent to further illegal aims. Id. at 919–20 (citing Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972)); see also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966)
(rejecting an Arizona statute that provided for “guilt by association” and punished
membership in the Communist Party or of any other organization that included the
overthrow of the Arizona state government as one of its purposes).
91. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (also known as the Partiya Karkeran
Kurdistan) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (also known as the Tamil
Tigers and the Ellalan Force) were designated as foreign terrorist organizations on
October 8, 1997. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (C.D.
Cal. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Designation of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650–51 (Oct. 8, 1997)). The plaintiffs claimed
that they were prevented from providing support to the PKK and the LTTE out of fear of
criminal sanctions. Id. at 1182. The plaintiffs’ main argument centered around the
AEDPA not requiring “specific intent” to further the illegal aims of the PKK and LTTE
before a criminal violation arises, thus imposing guilt by association and infringing upon
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The rule expressed in Claiborne Hardware and similar cases,
however, is applicable only in situations where people are punished “by
reason of association alone.”93 Conversely, the AEDPA does not necessarily
prohibit participating as a member in a designated group, supporting or
promoting the political goals of a designated group, or praising designated
groups for using terrorism to achieve certain political ends.94 Rather, the
AEDPA punishes the act of giving material support, including giving
organizations weapons and explosives to further their terrorist missions.95
In a major triumph, the AEDPA’s prohibitions were held not to
impose guilt by association, prompting the Ninth Circuit to affirm the
judgment of the district court.96 The court further bolstered the AEDPA’s
strength by refusing to require that the government demonstrate a
donor’s specific intent in aiding an organization’s illegal activities
before ascribing liability to the donation of funds.97 Material support,
plaintiffs’ protected free speech. Id. at 1185.
92. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1133. The plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief barring enforcement of the AEDPA against them. Id. The United States District
Court for the Central District of California (Justice Audrey B. Collins presiding) denied
the injunction due to the plaintiffs’ associational challenge, but enjoined enforcement on
vagueness grounds. Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1204; see also infra
Part III.B.3.
93. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Claiborne Hardware,
458 U.S. at 920). “[B]y reason of association alone” means merely participating in a
group or “espousing its views.” Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The AEDPA additionally prohibits providing resources with which terrorist
organizations may purchase weapons, explosives, and other military artillery. Id.
96. Id. at 1138; see also Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for
Relief & Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1015, 1027–28 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the AEDPA
does not violate the First Amendment right of free association and that the government’s
interest in preventing terrorism was sufficient to alter a statute that incriminated acts of
international terrorism and to apply it to a civil cause of action by injured plaintiffs). In
Boim, the plaintiffs filed a civil suit under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 against several nonprofit
entities accused of soliciting and laundering funds to finance a designated terrorist
organization whose members murdered the plaintiffs’ son. Id. at 1001–04. Section 2333
gives U.S. nationals and their survivors the right to sue in U.S. district courts for
damages incurred “by reason of an act of international terrorism.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)
(2000) (enacted as Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, §
1003, 106 Stat. 4506, 4521 (entitled “Terrorism Civil Remedy”)). The court in Boim
upheld the theory that the definition of terrorism as an activity “involv[ing] violent acts,”
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A), allows plaintiffs to raise claims against not only
those who engage in violent terrorist activity, but also those who aid and abet such acts.
Boim, 291 F.3d at 1015. This tort framework, which requires knowledge, intent, and
causation, protects § 2333 from claims of unconstitutionality because it punishes not
merely association, as the court in Claiborne Hardware condemns, but also the material
support of illegal activity that is left unprotected by the Constitution. Id. at 1026–27.
This opens the door to a new class of litigants alleging aiding and abetting rather than
“close involvement in violent terrorist activities.” Recent Case, Boim v. Quranic
Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002), 116 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (2002).
97. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1133–34. The court distinguished
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1063 (9th Cir. 1995)
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therefore, currently entails the promotion of an organization’s unlawful
activities, irrespective of a sponsor’s intent.98
2. Under the First Amendment: Political Advocacy and the
Question of Scrutiny
The plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project, in addition to making the
argument that the AEDPA’s antiterrorist provisions violated their
respective freedom of association rights,99 contended that both terrorist
organizations at issue engaged in political advocacy.100 Citing Buckley
v. Valeo,101 the plaintiffs argued that because “providing money to
organizations engaged in political expression is itself both political
expression and association,” they had not infringed the AEDPA.102
The court centered this debate on Americans’ right to associate with
foreign political groups through donations103 and determined that past
cases that likened monetary support to political expression “involved
organizations whose overwhelming function was political advocacy.”104
(requiring the government to establish a terrorist organization advocate’s “knowing
affiliation” and a “specific intent to further those illegal claims”) (citation omitted),
because “advocacy is far different from making donations of material support.”
Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1133–34.
98. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134. Opponents of the AEDPA
suggest that the federal government amend the Act and follow an antiterrorist funding
statute enacted by the Illinois legislature. See, e.g., Furst, supra note 88, at 500 (citing
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29C-5, 10, 15 (1999)). Unlike the AEDPA, the Illinois statute
requires a showing of a donor’s specific intent to fund an act of international terrorism.
Id. Although this requirement appears reasonable, it weakens law enforcement.
Hypothetically, if a sponsor donates money to an organization lacking the intent to fund
terrorism, the Illinois statute would prohibit the United States from blocking or
criminalizing this action, even though the organization may nonetheless use that money
for terrorist purposes. See id. The AEDPA’s primary purpose is to eliminate funds to
designated entities. The donor’s intent is irrelevant.
99. See supra Part III.B.1.
100. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134.
101. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Supreme Court established that attempts to
regulate financial campaign contributions pursuant to the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 are so closely related to and necessary for political expression so as to fall under
the First Amendment protection of free expression. Id. at 14.
102. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45
(“[T]he constitutionality of [the restrictions on contributions to political candidates] turns
on whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting
scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression.”).
103. See Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134 n.1.
104. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added). The court labeled Buckley as the “quintessential
example where the contributions were made to candidates for political office for the
purpose of helping them engage in electioneering.” Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12–
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While the First Amendment protects contributions to support U.S.
political advocacy, the Constitution does not protect the political advocacy
of foreign terrorist organizations within their own governments, which
was the case here.105 Moreover, the First Amendment protects the expressive
component of seeking and donating funds as pure speech, but not
expressive conduct.106 In other words, the government may choose to
regulate contributions not only to organizations that engage in unlawful
or harmful activities, but also to organizations that engage in lawful, but
not speech-related, activities.107
In addition, in allowing the legislature more leeway, § 2339B does not
merit strict scrutiny108 because the provision “is not aimed at interfering
with the expressive component of [the plaintiffs’] conduct but at
stopping aid to terrorist groups.”109 Rather, proper review falls under the
13). The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 specifically restricted political
contributions and expenditures applied to all phases and all participants of the election
process. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12–13.
105. See Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134 n.1 (citing United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that Fourth Amendment constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure could not be extended to a Mexican
citizen with no voluntary attachment to the United States)).
106. Id. at 1134–35.
107. Id. at 1135 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The government
generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the
written or spoken word.”). The issue is “not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the
expression, but the governmental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a
restriction on that expression is valid.” Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406–07.
108. Constitutional review is comprised of three main standards: (1) In order to
satisfy the strict scrutiny standard, the “most rigorous and exacting standard of
constitutional review,” a statute must be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest” and must be the least restrictive effective means of doing so. See Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995). Statutes based on racial classifications trigger the
strict scrutiny standard. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (applying
strict scrutiny to voting districts drawn with race as the predominant factor). (2) In order
to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, a more lenient level of scrutiny typically applied to
gender-based classifications, “the legislation must be substantially related to advancing
important or substantial governmental interests, and not be substantially more
burdensome than necessary to advance these interests.” R. Randall Kelso, Standards of
Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines
Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court
Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 228 (2002) (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.1, at 529 (1997) (noting that
“[i]ntermediate scrutiny is used for discrimination based on gender”)). (3) Under the
minimal rationality review, “the legislation only has to be rationally related to legitimate
governmental interests, and not impose irrational burdens on individuals.” Id. (citing
CHEMERINSKY, supra, § 9.1, at 529). The standard of review a court implements depends
on “a myriad of factors that counsel [a court] either to defer to legislative judgment, in
which case rational review is employed, or counsel [a court] to be suspicious of the
legislative action, in which case some form of heightened scrutiny is applied.” Id. at
228–29 (footnotes omitted).
109. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135. Compare United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a statutory
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intermediate scrutiny standard, which applies when “a regulation . . .
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression.”110 In applying
this standard, the court makes four inquiries: (1) “Is the regulation” at
issue within the constitutional “power of the government?” (2) Does the
regulation “promote an important or substantial government interest?”
(3) Is the promoted interest “unrelated to suppressing free expression?”
(4) “[I]s the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms no
greater than necessary?”111
The court in Humanitarian Law Project swiftly answered each of the
first three questions in the affirmative.112 The fourth question turned on
whether the AEDPA was tailored enough to accomplish its purpose of
“preventing the United States from being used as a base for terrorist
fundraising.”113 Because such a determination depends significantly on
foreign policy considerations, courts must allow political branches “wide
latitude in selecting the means to bring about the desired goal.”114 This
regulation that prohibited the burning of a draft card because the statute condemned only
the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach), with Johnson,
491 U.S. at 406 (applying strict scrutiny to law that prohibited the burning of flags that
offended witnesses because the law restricted the content of the message that flag
burning conveys).
110. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (alteration in original) (applying intermediate review
to a regulation that required concert performers to use the city’s sound amplification
equipment and sound technician in order for the city to regulate the volume of music
coming from the stage in the city’s park). The regulation pursuant to the AEDPA prohibits
aid to terrorist groups, not the freedom of expression. See Humanitarian Law Project,
supra.
111. Id. at 1135; see also O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
112. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135. (1) As to whether the federal
government had the power to regulate aid to terrorist organizations, the court held that it
clearly did through the power to enact laws restricting transactions between U.S. citizens
with foreign entities. Id. (2) As to whether the regulation promotes an important or
substantial government interest, the court identified such an interest in preventing the
spread of international terrorism. Id. (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)
(“Protection of the foreign policy of the United States is a governmental interest of great
importance, since foreign policy and national security considerations cannot neatly be
compartmentalized.”)). (3) The court found it true that this substantial interest is
unrelated to suppressing free expression because the government “restricts the actions of
those who wish to give material support to the groups, not the expression of those who
advocate or believe the ideas that the groups supports.” Id.
113. Id. at 1136.
114. Id. The plaintiffs additionally argued that the statutory scheme prior to the
amendments implemented by the AEDPA in 1996, see 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (1994),
which allowed individuals to donate humanitarian assistance to those who were not
directly involved in terrorist activity, had an acceptable scope and that the current
AEDPA scheme is overbroad. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136. The court
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latitude is sufficient enough so that the government need not employ the
least restrictive or least intrusive means to safeguard against terrorism.115
Consequently, the government’s decisions as to whether donations to
foreign terrorist organizations amount to material support are not met
with heavy skepticism.116 One reason for this is that Congress possesses
the factfinding resources necessary to make such conclusions properly.117
Largely due to this deference to legislative decisionmaking, the judiciary
has not found that the AEDPA restricts First Amendment freedoms to a
greater degree than necessary.118
3. Under the First Amendment: Vagueness
A final challenge presented by the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law
deflected this argument and acted on its presumption that Congress had a good reason to
expand the scope of the scheme’s antiterrorist provisions. Id.
115. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 798).
Rather, the intermediate scrutiny standard of review is satisfied so long as the AEDPA’s
antifundraising provisions promote a substantial governmental interest that would be
achieved less effectively had the AEDPA failed to exist. See United States v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
116. This deference to the government led to the rejection of an additional argument
asserted by the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project. Relying on Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), and Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City &
County of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), two cases holding certain
licensing schemes unconstitutional because they granted government officials
“unfettered discretion” to regulate First Amendment activity, the plaintiffs argued that
the AEDPA violated the First Amendment by “giving the Secretary ‘unfettered
discretion’ to limit their right to associate with certain foreign organizations, and by
insulating [the Secretary’s] decisions from judicial review.” Humanitarian Law Project,
205 F.3d at 1136. The Ninth Circuit provided more proof of the AEDPA’s strength,
distinguishing Forsyth and Gaudiya Vaishnava by noting that the regulations contained
in both cases encompassed First Amendment-protected activities over which government
officials enjoyed the pure discretion to regulate. Id. (The protected activities were parades in
Forsyth and the sale of merchandise carrying political, religious, philosophical, or
ideological messages in Gaudiya Vaishnava.) In contrast, the AEDPA does not
prescribe such empowerment; it fails to strictly scrutinize free speech or association per
se, focusing more on restricting expressive conduct, or the act of giving material support
to designated foreign organizations. Id. at 1136–37. Logically, the AEDPA does not
grant the Secretary unfettered discretion to render haphazard designations because the
Secretary may only designate groups that explicitly engage in terrorist activities, as
defined by statute, thus eliminating the likelihood that the International Red Cross or the
International Olympic Committee can ever be designated. Id. at 1137. In a sign of trust,
the court held that the AEDPA is not so trivial as to categorize the Secretary’s authority
as “unfettered discretion,” especially because the statute requires the Secretary’s grounds
for designation to be reasonable. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)).
117. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136 (stating that the court “will not
indulge in speculation about whether Congress was right to come to the conclusion that it
did”). In addition, the executive branch in designating foreign terrorist organizations
receives more latitude from the judiciary in regulating foreign affairs than domestic
conduct. Id. at 1137.
118. Id. at 1136.
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Project accused the AEDPA of being impermissibly vague under the
First Amendment.119 Under the vagueness doctrine, a law that does not
fairly inform a person “of ordinary intelligence” of what is commanded
or prohibited is unconstitutional as violating due process.120 Assuming
that persons are free to choose between lawful and unlawful conduct, the
doctrine “insist[s] that laws give [persons] of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that [persons] may
act accordingly.”121 Moreover, in order to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, it is crucial that laws provide “explicit
standards” for those who enforce them.122 For the AEDPA to survive a
vagueness challenge, it must define the “offense with sufficient
definiteness [so] that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited.”123
119. Id. at 1137.
120. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (determining the
vagueness of an antinoise ordinance that prohibited the noise or diversion adjacent to any
building in which a school or class was in session). The type of statute involved may
determine the amount of vagueness that the Constitution will permit. Vill. of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). For example,
economic regulations are subject to a more lenient vagueness test because its provisions
are often more narrow than, for example, a case involving the First Amendment. Id.; see
also United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963) (considering the
vagueness of the Robinson-Patman Act, a statute that incriminated the sale of goods at
unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying the competition, not only on its
face, but also as applied to the facts of the case).
121. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (noting that when people are required to live under a rule of law,
they “are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids”) (quoting
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)) (citations omitted)).
122. Id. at 108; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983). In Kolender,
the petitioner challenged a California statute that required persons who loiter or wander
to provide proof of “credible and reliable” identification when requested by a peace
officer. Id. at 353. The California Court of Appeal defined “credible and reliable”
identification as identification “carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is
authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has
identified himself.” Id. at 357 (quoting People v. Solomon, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 873 (Ct.
App. 1973)). Because the statute contained no standard for an individual to determine
what he or she could do to provide reliable and credible identification, it gave complete
discretion to the police in determining if the individual had met the requirements of the
statute. Id. at 358. The Supreme Court held that because the statute encouraged
arbitrary enforcement by not providing with sufficient particularity what an individual
must do to comply with the law, the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 361.
123. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357. The Supreme Court typically upholds statutes
in the face of vagueness challenges if statutory language includes words having wellknown technical or special meanings or settled common law meanings, or if the text or
subject matter of the statute affords some type of standard. Connally v. Gen. Constr.
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In particular, the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project alleged that
the terms “foreign terrorist organization” and “material support,” as
defined by the AEDPA, violated the vagueness doctrine.124 The district
court partially agreed, finding that two items “within the definition of
material support, ‘training’ and ‘personnel,’ were impermissibly vague,”
thereby issuing a limited preliminary injunction enjoining “the
prosecution of any of the plaintiffs’ members for activities covered by
these terms.”125
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit found that the term “personnel”
blurred the line between First Amendment-protected expression and
unprotected conduct, thus creating an element of uncertainty regarding
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1926). In Connally, the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin
officers from enforcing an Oklahoma statute providing that “not less than the current rate
of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed” shall be paid to laborers
on the basis that it was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 393. The Court held that the
statute was fatally uncertain because “the words ‘current rate of wages’ do not denote a
specific or definite sum, but minimum, maximum and intermediate amounts,
indeterminately, varying from time to time and dependent upon the class and kind of
work done, the efficiency of the workmen, etc.” Id. at 393. Although statutes must
define offenses with reasonable certainty, this does not mean that statutes cannot use
terms that are adequately interpreted by “common usage and understanding.” Boyce
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1952) (quoting Sproles v.
Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 393 (1932)) (upholding a statute as not unconstitutionally vague
because the statute was a product of a long history of regulation in which terms were
commonly understood).
124. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1137. The term “material support or
resources,” prior to the 2001 amendment by the Patriot Act, meant “currency or other
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or
religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2000) (emphasis added). The Patriot Act
amended the definition so that the phrase “or monetary instruments or financial
securities” replaced “or other financial securities,” and the term “expert advice or
assistance” was added. See Patriot Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805(a)(2), 115
Stat. 272, 377 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). However, the
term “expert advice or assistance” has been held unconstitutionally vague. Humanitarian
Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV 03-6107 ABC (MCx), 2004 WL 547534, at *15 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 2004). The term “foreign terrorist organization” is defined as “an
organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6). Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189, section
219 of the INA, before being amended by the Patriot Act, originally designated an
organization as a foreign terrorist organization if:
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity [or terrorism or retains the
capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism]; and
(C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United
States nationals or the national security of the Unites States.
8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2000), amended by Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56,
tit. IV, § 411(c), 115 Stat. 272, 349 (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–
(C) (Supp. I 2001)).
125. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1137.
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the scope of the AEDPA.126 For example, pure speech protected by the
First Amendment, such as advocacy, may be construed as supplying
personnel, especially when resources normally reserved for simply
advocating a foreign terrorist group are instead used to actively engage
in terrorist activities.127 Likewise, the court held that the term “training”
may also be construed to prohibit otherwise protected acts. For example,
instructing members of a designated organization on how to petition the
United Nations for aid and relief has little to do with donating to or
engaging in military training or training in terrorist activities, but may
nonetheless fall within the scope of the term “training.”128
Accordingly, because the plaintiffs established meritorious vagueness
claims with respect to both personnel and training, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion in issuing its
limited preliminary injunction and enjoining the plaintiffs’ prosecution in
the process.129
The vagueness challenge in Humanitarian Law Project may have
yielded some success, but subsequent challenges based on vagueness in
both United States v. Lindh130 and United States v. Goba131 fell on deaf ears,
thereby strengthening the AEDPA’s already vast constitutional scope.
In Lindh, the defendant relied on Humanitarian Law Project in making
the case that section 2339B was unconstitutionally vague.132 The court
rejected this argument and disregarded the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Humanitarian Law Project as being neither persuasive nor controlling,
noting that the plain meaning of “personnel” indicated exactly what the
term “personnel” typically purports: an employment or employment-like
relationship between the persons in question, and in this context, terrorist
organizations.133 The court further held that the term “personnel” is
126. Id.
127. Id. The government suggested that in order to keep the AEDPA from
overreaching on constitutionally-protected advocacy and other forms of free speech, the
court read into the statute a requirement that the activities prohibited be performed
“under the direction or control” of the foreign terrorist organization. The court declined,
due to lack of authority, to rewrite the law so as to survive constitutional scrutiny. Id. at
1137–38.
128. Id. at 1138.
129. Id.
130. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002); see also supra note 78 and accompanying
text.
131. 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 194 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
132. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
133. Id. at 574.
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unequivocally “aimed at denying the provision of human resources to
proscribed terrorist organizations, and not at the mere independent
advocacy of an organization’s interests or agenda” and that the term
gives “fair notice to the public of what is prohibited.”134 Thus, the court
found the term “personnel” to be sufficiently clear to defeat a void for
vagueness challenge.
Similarly, the court in Goba rejected a vagueness challenge when applied
to defendants accused of training at a known terrorist organization’s
camp.135 The court acknowledged that one can unambiguously provide
“material support or resources” by offering services to a terrorist
organization and by allowing oneself to become “indoctrinated and
trained as a ‘resource’ in that organization’s beliefs and activities.”136
The court responded to the defendants’ reliance on Humanitarian Law
Project, a civil case wherein the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief for
fear that their legitimate humanitarian activities would be criminalized
by the AEDPA, by citing Lindh, an analogous criminal indictment.137
The court in Goba quoted Lindh for the proposition that the statute was
not unconstitutional:
[Defendant] Lindh contends his conduct does not, as a matter of law, amount to
providing “material support and resources,” including “training” and
“personnel,” because he provided no training and that merely enlisting in an
armed force—rather than recruiting for such a force—does not constitute
providing personnel. Lindh is incorrect on both arguments.
Thus, to provide personnel is to provide people who become affiliated with
the organization and work under its direction: the individual or individuals
provided could be the provider himself, or others, or both.138

Consistent with Lindh and Humanitarian Law Project, in Goba, § 2339B
134. Id.
135. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 194. In Goba, the magistrate found that all six
defendants, also known as the “Buffalo Six,” had traveled to Pakistan in 2001 in two
separate groups and “attended a training camp . . . in Afghanistan at which Usama bin
Laden spoke espousing anti-American sentiment and received training in the use of
weapons and lectures on suicide as a means of causing harm to the enemy.” Id. at 192;
see United States v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Andrew
Cohen, Buffalo Six’s Day in Court, CBSNEWS.COM (Oct. 9, 2002), at http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/09/news/opinion/courtwatch/main524967.shtml. After several
weeks, the defendants returned to Lackawanna, New York, where they “resumed their
regular lives until their arrests on or about September 13, 2002.” Goba, 240 F. Supp. at
244–45 (denying the defendants’ motions for revocation of the magistrate’s detention
order). On December 3, 2003, the first member of the group, twenty-three-year-old
Mukhtar al-Bakri, was sentenced to ten years in prison after pleading guilty to providing
material support under § 2339B. Al Qaeda Trainee Gets 10-Year Sentence, CNN.com/
LAW CENTER (Dec. 3, 2003), at http://www.CNN.com/2003/LAW/12/03/buffalo.six.
136. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (recognizing that this principle is offered by the
district judge in Lindh).
137. Id. at 193.
138. Id. at 194 (quoting Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 577).

870

AGARWAL.DOC

[VOL. 41: 839, 2004]

9/17/2019 11:04 AM

Obstructing Justice
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

once again overcame a constitutional challenge, thereby completing the
string of victories.139
IV. HITTING A BRICK WALL: THE FALL OF THE AEDPA
Fresh off a major victory in March 2000,140 the AEDPA’s antifundraising
provision seemed constitutionally insurmountable. Section 2339B fought
off allegations that it wrongfully deprived individuals of their
associational rights.141 It dodged the dreaded strict scrutiny standard.142
Its defenders convinced courts to uphold contested terms in the face of
vagueness challenges.143 Finally, it preserved the government’s right to
criminalize the donation of material resources to designated terrorist
organizations without inspecting a donor’s intent.144 Moreover, it paved
the way for the Patriot Act despite critics’ screams that it shreds the
139. In summarizing the rise in the AEDPA, one scholar put it best:
Notwithstanding the concern raised by some commentators that the antifunding provisions of the AEDPA violate the First Amendment’s guarantees of
free speech and association, the only court that has squarely confronted this
issue has found otherwise. In light of the recent attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, and the favorable case law, it would be surprising if
the government did not become more aggressive in its enforcement of the antifunding provisions of the AEDPA.
Iraola, supra note 44, at 20 (footnotes omitted) (citing to Humanitarian Law Project as
the “only court”).
140. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
141. See supra Part III.B.1. Prior to Humanitarian Law Project, opponents boldly,
yet erroneously, stated the following:
The AEDPA ban not only unconstitutionally burdens free speech, but it also
impinges on the right of association. Under the Act, individuals are forced to
choose between going to jail or not contributing to a designated foreign
organization, even though they may only want to support the legal aims of the
group.
See, e.g., Beall, supra note 45, at 703–04 (footnote omitted).
142. See supra Part III.B.2. Opponents likewise declared the following: “The
AEDPA’s complete ban on speech in the form of contributions to particular groups
certainly would not satisfy strict scrutiny. As the name implies, strict scrutiny is a
difficult test for the government to overcome.” Beall, supra note 45, at 700 (footnote
omitted). Opponents also recognized that AEDPA proponents might argue that the Act
“regulates conduct and not speech.” Id. at 702. In that case, opponents acknowledged
that the intermediate scrutiny standard of United States v. O’Brien would apply but
maintained that the AEDPA fundraising ban would still fail because the governmental
interest was not “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” Id. (footnote omitted).
As it turned out, the court in Humanitarian Law Project held exactly the opposite. See
supra note 107 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part III.B.3.
144. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
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Constitution.145
With little luck in overthrowing the antifundraising provision, opponents
turned to the AEDPA’s other facet, section 1189, which describes the
procedure by which the Secretary designates an entity as a foreign
terrorist organization.146 Primarily, organizations complained that the
AEDPA’s designation procedure violated Fifth Amendment Due Process,
which guarantees the following: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”147 The Supreme
Court has held that, while the procedural protections required by the Due
Process Clause do not have “a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,”148 fundamental procedural due process nonetheless
requires the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”149 Because the AEDPA does not require the Secretary
to provide either notice or the opportunity for a hearing to entities
regarding impending designation, opponents have questioned the
validity of section 1189.150
In the first significant case to address a due process challenge against
section 1189,151 the D.C. Circuit in People’s Mojahedin Organization of
Iran v. Department of State (People’s Mojahedin)152 held that foreign
145. See, e.g., Van Bergen, supra note 28. In Van Bergen’s opinion: “The USA
Patriot Act is an insult to Americans. The name, itself, is insulting, given what the Act
contains and what it will someday be known for: its complete abdication of democratic
law and principles. It should be called the Constitution Shredding Act.” Id. In response
to such condemnation, Attorney General John Ashcroft called this criticism a “bold
declaration[] of so-called fact” that has dissolved into “vague conjecture” in light of the
U.S. Justice Department’s excruciating attention to detail in its terrorism prevention
strategy. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
316 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft).
146. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Courts interpret “this clause to have a procedural and a
substantive component.” Ellis, supra note 49, at 683–84 (citing JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.1, at 544–45 (6th ed. 2000)).
148. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
149. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
150. See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. Generally:
[a] court must examine three critical issues in any procedural due process
claim asserted by a foreign person or entity: (1) whether the person or entity
has a constitutional presence in the United States; (2) whether government
action deprived the person or entity of a constitutionally protected interest; and
(3) whether the procedural protections provided by the government, if any,
were constitutionally sufficient.
Ellis, supra note 49, at 684 (footnote omitted).
151. See Ellis, supra note 49, at 690.
152. 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The plaintiffs, the LTTE and the People’s
Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) (also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the
MEK, and the MKO), were designated as foreign terrorist organizations by then-
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organizations without property or presence in the United States are not
entitled to any due process protections.153 Two years later, the issue
Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright on October 8, 1997. See Designation of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650–51 (Oct. 8, 1997). Both
organizations sought judicial review of the designations under 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1).
People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 18–19. In support of designating the LTTE a foreign
terrorist organization, the court in People’s Mojahedin quoted unclassified material in
the Secretary’s administrative record as follows:
“The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was founded in 1976 for the purpose
of creating a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. The group began its war
against the Government of Sri Lanka in 1983 and has employed violent means,
including bombings and political assassination, to achieve the goal of a
separate entity in the North and East of the country. Some 50,000 people are
estimated to have died in fourteen years of fighting.” “Sri Lankan military and
intelligence sources that have reported reliably in the past have identified the
Ellalan Force as another alias for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,”
which “will hereafter be referred to as the ‘LTTE.’” “Headquartered in the
Jaffna Peninsula [of Sri Lanka], . . . Velupillai Prabhakaran,” “the founder and
leader of Sri Lanka’s LTTE . . . organized the insurgency group to pursue an
independent homeland for Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern regions
out of frustration over the ethnic discrimination of the Sri Lankan government,
according to press reports.” “Tamils . . . are the mainstay of his organization,
according to U.S. military officials.”
Id. at 19 (footnote omitted) (alterations in original). Furthermore, a February 1995 Hong
Kong news story stated that the LTTE tacitly had admitted to having killed former Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and that the group has been accused of killing Sri Lankan
President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Id. at 19–20. A State Department report in 1996 reported:
“The LTTE has refrained from targeting Western tourists, but a front group—the Ellalan
Force—continued to send threatening letters to Western missions and the press.” Id. at
20. Finally, designation is significant because the LTTE “exploits large Tamil communities
in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri
Lanka.” Id.
In further support of designating the PMOI as a foreign terrorist organization, a July
1993 CIA intelligence research paper reported that the PMOI’s primary goal is to
overthrow the Iranian government and that the organization’s history is “marked by
violence and terrorism” and is “studded with anti-Western activity.” Id. For example,
the PMOI assassinated at least six American citizens, supported the takeover of the U.S.
embassy, and opposed the release of American hostages during its part to overthrow the
former Shah of Iran. Id. The PMOI has had a history of bombing U.S.-associated
targets, including the Iran-American Society and the offices of Pepsi Cola, General
Motors, Pan-American Airlines, and Shell Oil Company. Id. Designation is also crucial
because the PMOI, whose main ally and supporter at the time was Baghdad, has offices
and members throughout North America, from which the PMOI collects donations to
fund the PMOI’s activities and to show the organization support. Id. at 20–21.
153. The plaintiffs challenged their respective designations, arguing that the
Secretary’s factfinding procedures deprived them of due process, particularly because
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause bars the government from condemning
organizations without giving them notice and the opportunity to be heard. Id. at 22
(referring to Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951),
which held that designating certain organizations as Communist violated due process).
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took center stage in National Council of Resistance of Iran v.
Department of State (National Council).154 Applying the three factor
balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge,155 the D.C. Circuit found that a
foreign organization with property in the United States is entitled, at a
minimum, to notice and to some type of hearing prior to designation by
the Secretary.156 The court viewed the procedural due process protections
The court rejected this claim because the entities at issue in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
had been domestic, whereas the LTTE and the PMOI were foreign entities with no
presence in the United States. Id. They were therefore not entitled to any constitutional
due process rights. Id. (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271
(1990) (“[A]liens receive constitutional protections [only] when they have come within
the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this
country.”) (alterations in original)). The court concluded that the plaintiffs enjoy only
statutory rights under the AEDPA, which allowed both organizations to contest their
designations on grounds set forth in § 1189(b)(3). Id. The court did not answer the
question of whether organizations with substantial connections in the United States are
afforded any due process rights under the AEDPA.
154. 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The petitioners, the PMOI and its alias, the
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), were redesignated and freshly designated
respectively as foreign terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State on October 8,
1999. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112, 55,112
(Oct. 8, 1999). The redesignation of the PMOI extended its 1997 designation for an
additional two years after the Secretary found that the organization had continued to engage in
terrorist activities, including the murder of two Iranian officials and “three separate
bombings of Iranian government facilities in Iran.” Ellis, supra note 49, at 692 n.116.
The Secretary designated the NCRI for the first time as an “alter ego or alias” of the
PMOI. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 197. Both petitioners argued that designating them as
foreign terrorist organizations without notice or hearing interfered with their rights to
obtain and possess property in the United States and the rights of their members to enter
the United States. Id. at 200. The Secretary thus “deprived them of ‘liberty, or property,
without due process of law,’ in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.” Id. The government’s defense was twofold, asserting that (1) the
petitioners had no protected constitutional rights because they had not established
physical presence in the United States, and (2) even if they did have such rights, none
had been violated. Id.
155. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Generally, before the government constitutionally
deprives a person of the protected liberty or property interest, the government must
afford the affected person notice and a hearing. Id. at 334. The professed “Mathews
balancing test” contains three distinct factors: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335. The test is applied to determine if an
individual is entitled to a hearing prior to a governmental deprivation of a protected
interest (the “when” of due process). See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 205–06, 208. The
test is also applied to identify the precise procedures to be employed at the hearing (the
“what” of due process). See id. The purpose of the constitutional right to be heard “is
not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual,” but more particularly, “to
minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations.” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 80–81 (1972).
156. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 208. Unlike the decision in People’s Mojahedin
Organization of Iran, the court in National Council determined that the PMOI had
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provided by the government under the AEDPA as constitutionally
insufficient.157
Although the court in National Council deemed the AEDPA’s
designation procedure invalid on due process grounds, the court neither
vacated the designations at issue nor explicitly declared the AEDPA
facially unconstitutional.158 One year later, a federal district court in United
States v. Rahmani159 called the National Council court’s attempt to save
the statute from facial invalidity “impermissible judicial legislation.”160
In Rahmani, the defendants moved to dismiss an indictment charging
them with violating § 2339B.161 The indictment described solicitations,
wire transfers, and monetary donations by the defendants for the benefit
of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) from October 8, 1997
entered and established substantial connections with the United States. Id. at 203. Its
alias, the NCRI, also developed substantial connections with the United States because
of its “overt presence within the National Press Building in Washington, D.C.” and an
interest in a two hundred dollar bank account. Id. at 201, 203; see also Ellis, supra note
49, at 693 n.122 (arguing that the only difference between a finding that PMOI lacked
any constitutional presence in People’s Mojahedin and a finding of constitutional
presence in National Council was the two hundred dollar bank account possessed by its
alias, the NCRI). Because presence was established, both organizations were entitled to
constitutional protections. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 203.
157. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 208–09.
158. Id. at 209. Due to foreign policy and national security concerns, the court
rather instructed that putative terrorist organizations receive the option of presenting and
filing evidence in support of their allegations that they were not terrorist organizations.
Id. In addition, the court required that these organizations be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to be heard by the Secretary upon the Secretary’s relevant findings. Id.
159. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
160. Id. at 1056–57 (citing Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 500–01 (9th Cir. 2001),
for the proposition that “where a statute permits only one permissible interpretation, it is
not the province of the federal courts to rewrite the statute to accommodate a different
interpretation” and Badaracco v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386, 398
(1984), for the proposition that “courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because
they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement”)). The Rahmani court did not
believe that the court’s attempt in National Council to constitutionally construct § 1189
would “save the statute from a claim of facial invalidity.” Id. at 1057. In addition, the
court in Rahmani noted that the government, by citing to precedent where the Supreme
Court upheld governmental actions even under an unconstitutional scheme, seemed to be
arguing that the result in National Council is legally supportable (especially because “the
D.C. Circuit found the MEK’s designation unconstitutional but, nevertheless, upheld
such designation”). Id. at 1058. The court noted that the cases cited by the government
were all civil cases, whereas the case at issue involved a criminal defendant charged with
crimes amounting to at least fifteen years imprisonment. Id. The court stood firmly in
its stance, choosing not to “abdicate its duty to ensure that the prosecution of such
charges comports with due process.” Id.
161. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
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through February 27, 2001.162 The defendants’ motion subsequently required
the Rahmani court to resolve what it tabbed a “somewhat provocative
question”:
If the procedure whereby an organization is designated by the Secretary of State
as “terrorist” violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution,
may such designation nevertheless be utilized as a predicate in a criminal
prosecution against individuals for providing material support to that designated
terrorist organization?163

The answer echoed a resounding “no.” The court established that
§ 1189 does not provide a foreign organization with notice of impending
designation, the occasion to supplement the record with information to
contradict the designation, or an opportunity to object to the administrative
record, which the Secretary creates and the judiciary solely considers on
appeal.164 Consequently, the court concluded that any designation under
the AEDPA is “a nullity” and thus could not be relied upon in a § 2339B
prosecution.165
The court in Rahmani drove a lethal stake into the AEDPA. To the
glee of political activists, the legislation, which not so long ago stood tall
as an effective weapon in stunting the growth of unwelcome and
162. The defendants were charged with conspiracy and fifty-eight substantive
counts of providing material support to the MEK, an entity designated as a foreign
terrorist organization under the AEDPA on October 8, 1997. Id.; Designation of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650–51 (Oct. 8, 1997). The MEK is
also known as the MKO and as the People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI).
Id. The indictment charged defendants Roya Rahmani, Mustafa Ahmady, Hossein
Afshari, Alireza Mohammadmoradi, Mohammad Omidvar, Navid Taj, and Hassan
Rezaie. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. The defendants were arrested at Los
Angeles International Airport (LAX) in February 2001 on charges of raising more than
one million dollars for the MEK. Two Iran-Related Terrorism Trials in U.S., 5 IRAN
REPORT (July 1, 2002), http://www.rferl.org/iran-report/2002/07/24-010702.html. The
defendants allegedly solicited funds from passengers at LAX for a “charity called the
Committee for Human Rights in Iran while displaying photos of alleged Iranian
atrocities.” Id. The money received was then “transferred to bank accounts in Turkey”
and allegedly used to buy weapons. Id.
163. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
164. Id. at 1055.
165. Id. at 1059. The court derived this conclusion from two specific provisions of
8 U.S.C. § 1189. The first, § 1189(a)(3)(A), provides: “In making a designation under
this subsection, the Secretary shall create an administrative record.” The second, §
1189(b)(2), provides: “Review under this subsection shall be based solely upon the
administrative record, except that the Government may submit, for ex parte and in
camera review, classified information used in making the designation.” Id. at 1055. The
court, in “[c]onsidering these two subsections together,” concluded: “Section 1189
provides for judicial review based solely on an administrative record created by the
Secretary, without notice to or participation by the organization to be designated.” Id. In
addition, the court noted that “apart from the administrative record, the only other matter
that may be considered for judicial review is classified information provided by the
government in support of the designation.” Id. Rather than constructing appropriate
procedures into the AEDPA, the court invalidated the Act altogether. See id. at 1058–59.
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historically violent organizations, was immediately reduced to facially
unconstitutional fodder. Yet, we must ask at what cost? Unquestionably,
U.S. national security, the very basis for the AEDPA,166 suffered a
severe setback. And while the court in Humanitarian Law Project
sidestepped well established precedent, such as NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.167 and Buckley v. Valeo,168 for the sake of national security,
the court in Rahmani failed to see the value of doing the same.169
Since 9/11, the value of homeland security deserves to overshadow the
rights of foreign organizations and their sponsors. Even Americans
themselves have consented to surrendering some of their freedoms for
stronger U.S. safety laws.170 By utilizing three arguments outlined below,
courts may provide the necessary framework required to revalidate the
AEDPA: (1) Referring to compelling national security concerns to
justify abridging procedural due process to terrorist organizations; (2)
166. In order for an entity to be designated as a foreign terrorist organization, the
Secretary must find that the organization’s terrorist activity threatens the security of U.S.
nationals or the national security of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (Supp. I
2001). Furthermore, a designation may be revoked depending on whether changed
circumstances or the national security of the United States warrants such action. See
supra note 65 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Prior to Humanitarian Law Project,
opponents predicted that the AEDPA fundraising ban would not survive the Buckley
scrutiny standard, even though Buckley upheld limitations on campaign contributions.
See Beall, supra note 45, at 700.
169. While the court in Rahmani ignored the government’s national security
argument when determining the constitutionality of § 1189, it relied on the government’s
judgment when refusing to settle the debate between certain members of Congress and
the Secretary regarding whether the designation of the MEK was legitimately and
factually supported. See Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. As to the uncertainty of the
designation, the court stated that “Congress, and not the courts, has the fact-finding
resources to conclude how best to prevent the United States from being used as a base
for terrorist funding.” Id. at 1052 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d
1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000)). Moreover, “[w]hether the MEK is a foreign terrorist
organization presents a political question. ‘Political questions’ are controversies which
revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionality committed to
the Congress or the Executive Branch, and are not subject to judicial review.” Id. at
1051. The court admitted that if it weighed in on the debate, it would create “the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.” Id. at 1052. However, this concern did not stop the court from
determining the constitutionality of § 1189, even when it had no statutory authorization
to do so. See infra Part IV.C.
170. Whitehead & Aden, supra note 22, at 1084 & n.8 (“[S]eventy-eight percent of
those polled stated they would accept new security laws, even if it meant fewer privacy
protections . . . .”) (citing NBC News/Wall Street Journal: 72% Say U.S. Is Moving in the
Right Direction, THE HOTLINE, Sept. 17, 2001, WL 9/17/2001 APN-HO 37).
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fulfilling four independent factors to defend security measures as
appropriate crisis legislation despite curtailing civil liberties; and (3)
recognizing that the decision that invalidated the AEDPA should be
revoked due to improper judicial review.
A. National Security: Abridging Procedural Due Process to
Terrorist Organizations
One effective policy-driven argument proffered by the government,
although irrelevant to the claim that § 1189 is facially unconstitutional,
is that invalidating the AEDPA would result in serious negative
consequences on U.S. counterterrorism efforts.171 National security is a
matter of “concern and responsibility,” the court responded, but such an
argument “should not serve as an excuse for obliterating the Constitution”
when “weighed against a fundamental constitutional right which defines
our very existence.”172 The court suggested that the Secretary should make
every effort “to weigh the circumstances where national security concerns
can rationally coexist within a constitutional atmosphere” and remarked
that the Secretary made no such attempt in the case at issue.173 The court
thus noted that “time honored constitutional protections” should not be
dispensed with by way of the Secretary’s failing to show how a
designated entity is a national security threat.174
The significance of national security should not be so easily dismissed.
Among all else, “‘no governmental interest is more compelling than the
security of the nation.’”175 Furthermore, the preservation of this country’s
safety constitutes an “extraordinary situation” that justifies postponing
both notice and the opportunity to be heard.176 For example, the Supreme
171. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (citing to the fourth footnote of the
government’s supplemental brief).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 1057–58 (noting that “[t]he moral strength, vitality and commitment
proudly enunciated in the Constitution is best tested at a time when forceful, emotionally
moving arguments to ignore or trivialize its provisions seek a subordination of time
honored constitutional protections”).
175. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 207 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (concluding that the United
States had a compelling governmental interest to protect foreign policy and revoke a
former CIA employee’s passport for denouncing the CIA and exposing confidential
information to foreign countries)).
176. Ellis, supra note 49, at 675–76 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90
(1972)). In Fuentes, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of Florida and
Pennsylvania laws authorizing the summary seizure of goods or chattels in a person’s
possession under a writ of replevin, neither of which provided notice or hearing to the
possessor of property prior to seizure. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 69–70. The Court concluded
that these statutes serve no important governmental or general public interest compared
to those statutes substantiated in state actions furthering war efforts or protecting the
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Court has allowed the outright seizure of property, without notice to the
possessor, only when “truly unusual” circumstances warrant the seizure,
and even then several safeguards must be met: (1) The seizure must be
“directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general
public interest”; (2) there must be a “special need for very prompt action”;
and (3) “the person initiating the seizure [must be] a government official
responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn
statute, that [action is] necessary and justified in the particular
instance.”177 The Court has curtailed procedural due process to meet the
needs of a war effort,178 to protect against certain economic disasters,179
and to protect the public from misbranded drugs180 and contaminated
food.181 Protecting against terrorism by designating predefined foreign
groups with financial assets in the United States as terrorist organizations
similarly represents an unusual circumstance worthy of postponing due
process. Under the elements set forth in Fuentes, the AEDPA results in:
(1) the securing of an important governmental interest by incriminating
donors and “seizing” resources contributed to foreign organizations in
order to deter acts of terrorism (a general public interest), (2) the ability
to act promptly especially because such action may be the difference
between preserving life and mass casualties, and (3) a determination
made by a government official (the Secretary) in accordance with the
terms of a narrowly tailored statute (the AEDPA).182
Thus, without mentioning the procedural elements underlying the Due
Process Clause,183 national security interests alone justify the abridgement
public health. Id. at 92–93.
177. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90–91.
178. See Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 245 (1921) (holding that enemy property
may be seized during wartime without notice so long as an adequate provision for return
in the case of a mistake was provided); Cent. Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554,
566 (1921) (stating that Congress has the power to seize property of the enemy during
times of war without notice).
179. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253 (1947) (stating that the “delicate
nature” of certain economic situations have created an “almost invariable custom” to
allow the exercise of authority in a “summary manner” and without a hearing).
180. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950).
181. See N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908).
182. See Ellis, supra note 49, at 707–09 (applying the elements to the specific facts
of National Council).
183. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also supra note 147.
Courts, in “[a]pplying this so-called Mathews balancing test,” hold that due process
requires “that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Ellis, supra note 49, at
689 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)). However, in
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of “time honored constitutional protections.”184 Moreover, requiring the
Secretary to show at the outset that a security threat exists within a
designated group will hinder, not help, the long and difficult fight
against terror.185 If an organization receives notice, especially in a
predesignation hearing as advocated by the court in National Council,186
the organization may immediately circumvent the harsh consequences of
designation by, for example, “transfer[ring] all of its financial assets
outside the jurisdiction of the United States.”187 This undoubtedly frustrates
both the “intent of Congress and the foreign policy goals of the
President”188 and leaves the AEDPA with no deterrent effect, no
consequence, and no meaning.
The court in National Council simply refused to understand this
concern, despite recognizing three concepts that seem to support the
contrary. First, the “changeable and explosive nature of contemporary
international relations” should be sufficient to warrant dispensing with
an otherwise available predeprivation hearing.189 Second, certain classified
information not considered dangerous, or even important, by judges may
nonetheless “make all too much sense to a foreign counterintelligence
specialist who could learn much about this nation’s intelligencegathering capabilities from what these documents revealed about sources
“extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake,”
postponement of a hearing until after the deprivation of the interest at issue is justified.
Ellis, supra note 49, at 689 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
Therefore, even when applying the Mathews factors of procedural due process, fighting
terrorism may be argued to invoke the “extraordinary situation” exception that justifies
postponing due process. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251
F.3d 192, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
184. United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
185. Since 9/11, the United States has consistently warned that the war against
terrorism will be long, difficult, and dangerous. See Nick Cook, “A Long, Difficult and
Dangerous Campaign,” JANE’S DEFENCE WEEKLY (Oct. 2, 2001), http://www.janes.com/
defence/airforces/news/jdw/jdw011002_1_n.shtml (citing to comments made by U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld). The Bush Administration has consistently
warned Americans to brace for a long and bloody campaign. See Afghanistan: One Year
Later, CNN.COM (Oct. 10, 2002), at http://www.CNN.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/10/
timep.afghanistan.year.later.tm/index.html.
186. See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207–08.
187. Ellis, supra note 49, at 676.
188. Id.
189. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207 (quoting Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 853
F.2d 932, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). In Shultz, the State Department ordered the closing of
the Palestine Information Office (PIO) in Washington, D.C. after it found that the PIO
operated as a foreign mission for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Shultz,
853 F.2d at 934. The national interest of curbing international terrorism mandated this
action pursuant to the Foreign Missions Amendments Act of 1983. See id.; see also
Foreign Missions Amendments Act of 1983, 22 U.S.C. § 4301 (2000). The PIO’s due
process claim failed on appeal because foreign policy concerns and explosive
international relations defer to the need of the executive branch to act swiftly and
authoritatively. Shultz, 853 F.2d at 942–43.
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and methods.”190 In other words, requiring the Secretary to convey this
information to the very organizations being denounced, simply in order
to preserve due process, would enervate U.S. intelligence. Third, alerting
organizations of impending designation “might work harm to this
country’s foreign policy goals in ways that the court would not
immediately perceive.”191
In recognizing these principles, the court opened the door for an
exception, consistent with the full history of due process jurisprudence,
in cases where earlier notification of designation would impinge upon
U.S. national security and other foreign policy goals.192 In these cases,
the Secretary may demonstrate the need to withhold all notice and all
opportunity to present evidence until a designation formally takes
place.193 However, this exception is not an adequate solution because
the court in National Council admitted that, in most circumstances, as
soon as the Secretary reaches a tentative determination of the impending
designation, the Secretary must provide notice of unclassified material,
including the action sought.194 This in turn provides enough forewarning
so that a designated entity may evade as much statutory punishment as
possible.195
Decided before the 9/11 attacks,196 National Council’s valiant yet
shortsighted effort to carve out an exception fails to address the
compelling national security concerns that encompass the current state
of international affairs.197 The same cannot be said for Rahmani, a
190. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 208 (quoting United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617,
623 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
191. Id. The court provides an example of one such notice that the Secretary may
give to putative terrorist organizations: “We are considering designating you as a foreign
terrorist organization, and in addition to classified information, we will be using the
following summarized administrative record. You have the right to come forward with
any other evidence you may have that you are not a foreign terrorist organization.” Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 209. The Secretary may withhold classified information to be
presented in camera and ex parte to the court under the AEDPA, but still must disclose
the action sought. Id. at 208.
195. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
196. National Council was argued on November 15, 2000 and decided on June 8,
2001. 251 F.3d at 192.
197. Two days after the 9/11 attacks, House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt
(D-Mo.) stated: “We’re in a new world where we have to rebalance freedom and
security.” Eric Pianin & Thomas B. Edsall, Terrorism Bills Revive Civil Liberties
Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at A16. The events of 9/11 have also led to the
advent of the “Homeland Security Advisory System,” a color-coded U.S. threat advisory
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decision that devoted relatively little thought to the government’s
security concerns, despite being decided nine months after the events of
9/11.198 The Rahmani court cited Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,199 a
1963 case involving the constitutionality of divesting draft evaders of
their citizenship,200 and quoted Ex parte Milligan, a similar case decided
in 1866,201 as its only support for choosing to safeguard due process even
in the gravest of emergencies.202 With respect to a changed world, these
sources are painfully inadequate.
B. Crisis Legislation: The Age-Old Conflict Between
Civil Liberties and National Security
The conflict between civil liberties and national security is as old as
the United States itself.203 It is certainly not novel to offer safety as a
system unveiled by Homeland Security Chief Tom Ridge that creates “‘a national
framework and a common vocabulary’ so that government and the private sector can
deal effectively and efficiently with threats of terrorist attack.” Terror Threat Warning
System Unveiled, CNN.COM (Mar. 12, 2002) (quoting Homeland Security Chief Tom
Ridge), at http://www.CNN.com/2002/US/03/12/rec.threat.alerts/index.html. The warning
system is comprised of five levels starting with green, the lowest alert level, then blue,
yellow, orange, and red, the highest alert level. Id. Each code and color triggers certain
actions by federal agencies and state and local governments. Id.; see also Ridge Tries to
Calm America’s Nerves, CNN. COM (Feb. 14, 2003), at http://www.CNN.com/2003/
ALLPOLITICS/02/14/homeland.security/index.html (describing the heightened fear of
Americans as a result of the system’s elevated terror alert, causing people to seal their
homes with plastic sheeting and duct tape in the case of a chemical attack).
198. United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(decided June 21, 2002).
199. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
200. Id. at 164–65 (1963) (determining that draft evaders should be punished but
not without due process of the law).
201. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 20–21 (1866) (holding that the
Constitution applies equally in times of war as well as times of peace). For further
discussion of Ex parte Milligan, a dispute involving the conviction by a military
commission of a civilian who had not joined the Confederacy, see Oren Gross, Chaos
and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE
L.J. 1011, 1053 (2003).
202. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 n.15.
203. PBS, Civil Liberties and National Security Timeline, at http://www.pbs.org/
now/politics/timeline.html (Feb. 7, 2003). In 53 A.D., Roman philosopher Marcus
Tullius Cicero stated: “[I]nter arma enim silent leges (amidst the clash of arms, laws fall
silent).” Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of Aggression?, 19
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 427 n.66 (2000) (discussing crimes of aggression
in an international context). Similarly, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist has recognized that times of questionable international safety impact
Americans’ domestic freedoms. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 224 (1998). Chief Justice Rehnquist commented: “It is neither
desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a position in
wartime as it does in peacetime.” Id. at 224–25. Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (RMiss.) has echoed this sentiment, admitting that “when you’re at war, civil liberties are
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reason to diminish certain constitutional rights when the situation
warrants. For example, threatened by Confederate forces during the
Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas
corpus, reduced freedom of the press, and tried civilians in military
tribunals.204 Furthermore, during World War I, Congress outlawed
mailings advocating treason, insurrection, and forcible resistance to U.S.
law in order to suppress fear of subversion by propagandists.205 A
treated differently.” Pianin & Edsall, supra note 197. In contrast, Rep. John Conyers
(D-Mich.), proclaimed: “Safety should not come at the sacrifice of civil liberties.” Toni
Locy, Justice Dept. Prohibits Racial Profiling: But Agents Can Use It to Identify
Terrorists, USA TODAY, June 18, 2003, at 3A (reacting to the Bush Administration’s
policy of banning federal law enforcement officers from racial profiling in routine police
work yet permitting the use of race and ethnicity in identifying suspected terrorists).
204. Special Event, The Impeachment Trial of President Abraham Lincoln, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 351, 351 (1998). Lincoln is often considered a “champion of justice and moral
righteousness,” but his suppression of civil liberties during the Civil War “casts him in a
somewhat unfavorable light.” Captain Robert G. Bracknell, All the Laws But One: Civil
Liberties in Wartime, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 208, 209–10 (2000) (book review) (explaining
that the writ of habeas corpus, or “The Great Writ,” requires the executive to legitimately
justify the detainment of a prisoner to a court of law and that the writ is considered a
“sacred right of the people against sovereign authority”). Writing for the Supreme Court
in the case of John Merryman, a southern sympathizer arrested for “destroying railroad
bridges after an antiwar riot in Baltimore,” Chief Justice Roger B. Taney ruled that
President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus was unconstitutional because (1) only
Congress could suspend habeas corpus, and (2) the President as a result exceeded his war
powers. Anne English French, Trials in Times of War: Do the Bush Military
Commissions Sacrifice Our Freedoms?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225, 1229–30 (2002) (citing
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861)). Although Justice Taney rejected the
proposition that at times of war the President has the authority to do whatever is
necessary to protect the country, he did acknowledge that an act of Congress could
authorize the suspension. Id. at 1230. On March 3, 1863, after President Lincoln
requested that Congress sanction his actions, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act,
authorizing the President “to suspend habeas corpus whenever he determined public
safety required suspension.” Id. at 1231–32. For more on President Lincoln’s role as a
civil libertarian, see generally Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties and Civil War: The Great
Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1353 (1993) (reviewing MARK E.
NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991)).
205. See Murray L. Schwartz & James C.N. Paul, Foreign Communist Propaganda
in the Mails: A Report on Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
621, 624 (1959). After the United States entered World War I in April of 1917, antiGerman sentiment rose to great heights. Consequently, Americans considered support of
German culture and any criticism of the war as treason. Congress passed a series of
laws, including the Espionage Act of 1917, which “made it a crime to interfere with the
military or recruiting services or to mail materials ‘advocating treason, insurrection, or
forcible resistance to any law of the United States.’” Joseph A. Ranney, Aliens and
“Real Americans”: Law and Ethnic Assimilation in Wisconsin, 1846–1920, WIS. LAW.,
Dec. 1994, at 30–31. The act was expanded in 1918 “to prohibit criticism of the flag, the
armed forces, the Constitution and the American form of government.” Id. at 31. In
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countless number of cases exist where, in times of stress and conflict,
many civil liberties have been compromised in the name of national
security; yet not all of these cases are legitimately supported.206 In an
effort to justify the AEDPA as appropriate crisis legislation, thus
distinguishing it from previous blatant attacks on civil liberties, this
Comment sets forth a four-prong security legislation test. If each prong
of this test is met, U.S. security legislation should pass constitutional
justification even if individual rights are sacrificed in the process.
The first prong of the test requires the presence of an “undeclared”
war or commencement of armed aggression,207 leading to extraneous
foreign and international hostilities implicating a substantial U.S.
interest. International terrorism, such as the 1993 World Trade Center
and 1995 Oklahoma City bombings,208 is a prime illustration, as is the
addition, the Selective Draft Act of 1917 criminalized the act of “discourag[ing] men
from registering for the draft or serving in the armed forces.” Id. at 59 n.18. The
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 required “publishers of foreign language articles
about the war” to “file English translations . . . with local postmasters before
publication.” Id. Due to the heavy expense, many foreign language newspapers were
forced to shut down. Id. The Tariff Act of 1930 authorized customs officials to seize
any material advocating treason or insurrection, thereby denying the importation of such
material into the country. See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 688 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1305 (2000)).
206. For an introductory discussion on the relationship between security and liberty
in the United States, see David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 955–58
(2002) (arguing that, when balancing liberty and security, it is important to preserve
equal dignity and basic human rights of all persons and not to succumb to the temptation
of purchasing security at the expense of noncitizens’ basic rights). Cole gives three
reasons to be cautious about too readily sacrificing liberty in the name of security,
especially in the wake of 9/11. First, as a historical matter, the United States has often
overreacted in times of crisis. Id. at 955. Second, in times of crisis, there is a chance
that the United States will overestimate its security needs. This sentiment may lead to
feelings of physical stress and anxiety, which are much more “immediate and palpable”
than the abstract concept of “liberty,” which can easily be taken for granted. Id. at 955–
56. Third, liberty and security are not “mutually exclusive values in a zero-sum game.”
Id. at 956. In other words, decreasing liberty does not necessarily increase security. Id.
Often, decreasing liberty inspires more violence. Id. While these reasons are worthy of
mention, they are given to criticize the unequal treatment of non-U.S. citizens in relation
to U.S. citizens, and not to criticize the antifundraising provisions of the AEDPA. See
id. at 957.
207. See Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1543, 1543–48 (2002). This definition is intended to be broad, as was the definition of
“declaring war” in the eighteenth century, and is meant to include armed attacks with the
intent to settle differences between nations by force even if no formal proclamations of
war are present. See id. Undeclared wars and low level hostilities were a great part of
eighteenth century reality, and formal declarations were not necessary or even common
prior to initiating these hostilities. Id. at 1558. In addition, although most scholars agree
that the term “‘armed attack’ entails a serious attack, which is not one-time, against the
territory of a State or its citizens,” the definition as used here does incorporate serious
one-time attacks. See Gross, supra note 44, at 93.
208. See supra notes 41–42. The February 26, 1993 bombing of New York City’s
World Trade Center, which along with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing provoked the
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post 9/11 undeclared “War on Terrorism.”209
The second prong of the test requires that only those who possess
certain qualities, or belong to a certain class as set forth by specific
statutory rules, will have their constitutional rights compromised. In
other words, before any group has its rights abridged, it must satisfy a
set of meticulously predefined provisions and qualifications set forth in a
duly elected statute. For example, the AEDPA provides detailed guidelines
for designating a group as a foreign terrorist organization.210
The third prong of the test requires that the penalties of designation as
a specific group under the statute must have reasonable temporal limits.
For instance, the penalties of designation under the AEDPA last two
years.211
The fourth and final prong of the test requires that an appropriate and
specified appellate process exist by which the affected class of persons
passage of the AEDPA, was remembered at the time as “the gravest attack of
international terrorism to occur directly on American soil.” Anti-Defamation League,
The World Trade Center Bombing, at http://www.adl.org/learn/jttf/wtcb_jttf.asp (last
visited Apr. 6, 2003). Moreover, international hostilities between the United States and
Iraq can be linked to both bombings. A persuasive case has been made that World Trade
Center bombing mastermind Ramzi Yousef was an Iraqi intelligence agent. Jack Kelly,
Jewish World Review, Saddam’s American Friends (Apr. 8, 2002), at http://www.jewish
worldreview.com/0402/jkelly040802.asp. When Timothy McVeigh, executed for his
role in the Oklahoma City bombing, was arrested, he had several Iraqi telephone
numbers on his person. Id. Witnesses claimed to have seen McVeigh with a “Middle
Eastern-looking person.” Id. Furthermore:
An Iraqi connection could explain [multiple facets of the Oklahoma City
bombing, including] the frequent trips to the Philippines of McVeigh
confederate Terry Nichols, where his path apparently crossed with that of
Ramzi Yousef; how McVeigh and Nichols, who had no visible means of
support, acquired the money to carry out the bombing; and how they acquired
the expertise to build their bomb, which was very like the explosive used at the
World Trade Center the year before.
Id.
209. See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 22, at 1085. Moreover:
The terrorist enemy that threatens civilization today is unlike any we have ever
known. It slaughters thousands of innocents—a crime of war and a crime
against humanity. It seeks weapons of mass destruction and threatens their use
against America. No one should doubt the intent, nor the depth, of its
consuming, destructive hatred.
Hearings, supra note 145, at 315. Similarly, the Patriot Act defines domestic terrorism
as acts dangerous to human life that occur primarily in U.S. jurisdiction and are intended
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or intended to influence the government, by
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. See Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56,
§ 802, 115 Stat. 376.
210. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (Supp. I 2001).
211. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(A) (2000).
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may, in a U.S. tribunal, contest the alleged deprivation of their
constitutional rights. The AEDPA sets forth a timeframe for judicial
review as well as multiple grounds for reversal.212
Critics may argue that this test is far too stringent and that only the
most complete and detailed measures will satisfy it. Others will claim
that national security legislation is often enacted immediately following
a catastrophic event, making these factors almost impossible to satisfy
on such short notice. Both of these arguments are fair and deserve
consideration. It undeniably takes a comprehensive, carefully planned,
and narrowly tailored government action to pass this test.213 Abruptly
written and hastily enacted laws will most likely fail. But more
importantly, properly drafted laws can ultimately pass this test, and the
most meritorious will survive the inevitable process of judicial review.
Such legislation will allow the government to strengthen national
security during the most ominous times of stress and crisis. The
AEDPA passes this test.
In order to better assess the usefulness of the “security legislation test”
and to distinguish the AEDPA from previous attacks on individual
freedoms, the following subsections will apply the four factors set out
above to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798214 and the propriety of
Japanese internment camps during World War II.
1. Distinguishing the Alien and Sedition Acts
Within a four-week period in the summer of 1798, President John
Adams incurred tremendous condemnation due to a set of four laws,
known as the Alien and Sedition Acts, enacted by the Federalist Partycontrolled Congress under his guard.215 Provoked by fear that the French
212. See supra Part III.A.
213. Passing this test may equal satisfying the strict scrutiny standard, the most
rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional review. See supra note 108. In order to
overcome this standard, a statute must be narrowly tailored to directly advance a
compelling governmental interest. Id. However, unlike the security legislation test
proposed herein, strict scrutiny also requires that the statute at issue be the least
restrictive effective means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. See id. It
is also important to note that under the test, race-based classifications may pass initially,
but will likely fail once opponents challenge them in court or in another arena in which
they are permitted to invoke judicial review.
214. The immigration provisions of the Alien and Sedition Acts have been
compared with those in the Patriot Act. See Jennifer Van Bergen, Repeal the USA
Patriot Act Part II: The Wheel of History (Apr. 2, 2002), at http://www.truthout.
org/docs02/04.03D.JVB.Patriot.htm.
215. See Gregory Fehlings, Storm on the Constitution: The First Deportation Law,
10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 63, 64–65 (2002); see also Martin E. Halstuk, Policy of
Secrecy—Pattern of Deception: What Federalist Leaders Thought About a Public Right
to Know, 1794–98, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 51, 70–73 (2002). Congress enacted four
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Revolution would spread into the United States and by certain political
tactics by the British Parliament,216 Congress intended to bolster national
defense against both external threats and internal subversion.217 The laws
also sought to gain an “upper hand” on Thomas Jefferson’s DemocraticRepublican Party,218 which sympathized with and “proudly supported
the French Revolution as progeny of the American Revolution.”219
Comprised of two parts, the Sedition Act220 created the most daunting
restraint on civil liberties, prohibiting spoken or written criticism of
Congress, the President, and the U.S. government in general.221 The first
statutes in this “crisis-laden” atmosphere—the Alien Act, Alien Enemies Act,
Naturalization Act, and Sedition Act. These collectively became known as the Alien and
Sedition Acts. Fehlings, supra, at 65; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of
‘98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 703–04 (1994) (noting that
hostilities between the Americans and French “accelerated after negotiations between the
countries broke down altogether in March 1798”).
216. Edmund Burke, an eighteenth century Irish political philosopher and liberal
member of the British Parliament, warned in 1790 that the French Revolution “by its
nature would spread violently to other countries.” Fehlings, supra note 215, at 66. The
British Parliament responded, passing the Alien Act of 1793 and the Seditious Meetings
and Assemblies Act of 1795 to “prevent spread of the French Revolution to Britain.” Id.
217. Id. at 64–65. Though “France had helped the United States win its
independence during the Revolutionary War, the French Revolution had transformed the
European nation.” Id. at 64. France sought a revolutionary republic, all while beheading
King Louis XVI in 1793 and executing 17,000 people in eleven months. Id. After this
period, named “‘The Terror,’ the French Directory, a ruling council of five directors,
assumed power in 1795.” Id. After “Presidents George Washington and John Adams
refused to allow the United States to be dragged into France’s wars against Great Britain
and other European powers, the French Directory launched a retaliatory war of
commercial plunder against America,” during which “[t]he French seized over 2,000
American merchant ships.” Id. This and other developments, including news that
“General Napoleon Bonaparte had assembled an invasion force,” prompted Congress to
take measures for stronger internal security. Id. at 64–65.
218. Nancy Murray & Sarah Wunsch, Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis: Lessons
from History, 87 MASS. L. REV. 72, 73 (2002).
219. Fehlings, supra note 215, at 65. Jefferson wrote that “he preferred to see ‘half
the world desolated’ than see the French Revolution falter.” Id. (footnote omitted).
220. The House of Representatives narrowly passed the Sedition Act by a 44 to 41
vote. Halstuk, supra note 215, at 70 (citing Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat.
596–97 (expired 1800)).
221. § 2, 1 Stat. at 596–97. The Sedition Act provided the following:
And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish,
or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall
knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or
publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the
government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United
States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said
government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against
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part of the Act forbade planned resistance to public measures.222 The
second part proscribed criticism of the government that was “malicious,
untrue, alienated the people’s affections from their government, or
brought the government into the contempt of the people.”223 Within two
years of Congress’s passing the law, “[twenty-five] persons were arrested,
up to [eighteen] were indicted and [ten] were tried and convicted, most
of them Republican printers and journalists who supported Jefferson.”224
Although virtually all of today’s commentators agree that the Sedition
Act violated fundamental principles of representative democracy, many
scholars in the late eighteenth century defended seditious libel laws and
called government dissenters undemocratic.225
The other three laws, most relevant in the context of protecting against
foreign attacks, were expressly directed at aliens due to fear of French

Id.

them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United
States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful
combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or
any act of the President of the United States, done in pursuance of any such
law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States, or
to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any
hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or
government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the
United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two
years.

222. James P. Martin, When Repression Is Democratic and Constitutional: The
Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
117, 122 (1999).
223. Id.
224. Halstuk, supra note 215, at 71. The Sedition Act lasted less than two years,
just as the Democratic-Republican Party came to power. Judith Schenck Koffler &
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 827 (1984).
Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolutions in 1798, which denounced the Sedition Act
and helped him earn the presidency in 1800, “whereupon he pardoned those convicted
under the Act and remitted their fines.” J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy
Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402, 1407 (1992).
225. See Martin, supra note 222, at 123–27. The Federalists, for example, argued
that by obstructing the government’s ability to make policy decisions, one “obstructs the
majority” because the majority had elected the government to make those decisions. Id.
at 127. Federalists also argued that one who insulted elected officials insulted the people
who elected them. Id. Moreover, Federalists relied upon the common law as an adjunct
to the Constitution, which provided that the United States “as a sovereign power
possessed, ‘from the nature of things,’ the inherent ‘right to preserve and defend itself
against injuries and outrages that endanger its existence.’” Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of
Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the
Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 938 (1992) (quoting 8
ANNALS OF CONG. 2146 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Otis)).
Even Jefferson did not attack the Sedition Act on grounds that Congress wrongfully
abridged freedoms of speech and the press, but that the laws were unconstitutional
because the states, not the federal government, owned the natural rights to regulate the
press. Halstuk, supra note 215, at 73.
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invasion and insurrection.226 First, the Naturalization Act increased the
time of residence necessary to acquire U.S. citizenship, and thus the
right to vote, from five to fourteen years.227 Citing national security
reasons and improved monitoring of potentially subversive aliens,
“Congress barred the naturalization of aliens of a country at war with the
United States, and it commanded all white immigrants to register with
the government.”228 Not coincidentally, immigrants were increasingly
offering their political support to Republicans.229 Second, the Alien
Act230 gave the President enormous discretion to imprison or deport
aliens suspected of posing a threat to the national government without a
formal hearing.231 The final component, the Alien Enemies Act,232 further
226. Fehlings, supra note 215, at 66–69. In fact, “John Quincy Adams, President
Adams’ son and U.S. Ambassador to Prussia, advised his father that France intended to
invade America’s western frontier.” Id. at 66. Speculation of French troops destined for
the United States induced President Adams to call George Washington from retirement
in order to command the U.S. Army. Id. “French emigré Médéric Louis-Elie Moreau de
Saint-Méry wrote . . . of the nation’s anxiety: ‘People acted as though a French invasion
force might land in America at any moment. Everybody was suspicious of everybody
else: everywhere one saw murderous glances.’” Id. at 67 (footnote omitted).
227. See id. at 69.
228. Id.; see Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566–69 (1798) (repealed by
Naturalization Act, § 2, 2 Stat. 153 (1802)).
229. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act,
and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and
Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833, 834 (1997).
230. The Alien Act is also known as “An Act Concerning Aliens” (Alien Act). An
Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798). Congress modeled the Alien Act on
the British Aliens Act of 1793, “which authorized the expulsion of any alien considered
dangerous.” Fehlings, supra note 215, at 70. The law was to expire in two years but was
never enforced. Id. at 71, 74. The Supreme Court would later remark: “The act was
passed during a period of great political excitement, and it was attacked and defended
with great zeal and ability.” Id. at 70 (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 610–11 (1889)).
231. Fehlings, supra note 215, at 70–74. Specifically, the law, as a temporary war
measure, authorized the President at his discretion to deport aliens “dangerous to the
peace and safety of the United States” or those suspected of “any treasonable or secret
machinations against the government.” Id. at 73. Fehlings also characterized the Alien
Act as:
requir[ing] captains of arriving ships to report all aliens on board. An alien
who reentered the United States after having been expelled committed a
criminal offense, and upon conviction, the alien faced imprisonment for as
long as, in the opinion of the President, the public safety required. Federal
courts had jurisdiction over “all crimes and offenses against this act,” but all
other matters lay within the President’s authority.
Id. at 72; see also Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570–71 (1798).
232. This Act is also known as “An Act Respecting Alien Enemies.” Alien
Enemies Act, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (1798).
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provided for the arrest, confinement, and expulsion of aliens of an
enemy nation.233
The Alien and Sedition legislation may have been passed at a time of
international hostility between the United States and France, but all four
of the Acts fail under the security legislation test.234 The Alien Enemies
Act, the lone statute that has survived intact to the present day,235 fulfills
the first two prongs236 but fails to delineate the time period for which its
provisions deprive aliens of their constitutional rights.237 The Alien
Enemies Act also fails to provide an adequate appellate procedure by
which aliens of an enemy nation may seek judicial review.238 As a
result, the Alien and Sedition Acts are invalid examples of national
233. In particular, the Alien Enemies Act provided for the arrest, confinement, or
expulsion of aliens of an enemy nation:
whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any
foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion shall be
perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States, . . .
and the President of the United States shall make public proclamation of the
event.
Id. Upon such a proclamation or such a declaration of war, alien enemies could be
arrested, detained, and removed from the United States without a hearing. Id.
234. See supra Part IV.B.
235. Sidak, supra note 224, at 1407. “The [Alien Enemies] Act, with minor revisions,
remains part of the United States Code to this day and has been used as recently as
1950.” Fehlings, supra note 215, at 74; see also Ex parte Zenzo Arakawa, 79 F. Supp.
468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (“There can be no question that the Enemy Aliens Act is
constitutional.”). Its constitutionality was never seriously questioned by pro-Federalist
intellects such as Jefferson and James Madison. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160,
171 n.18 (1948) (observing that “there was never any issue raised as to the validity of the
Alien Enemy Act”).
236. First, the Alien Enemies Act “reflected the tensions that existed between the
United States and France . . . that eventually erupted into the undeclared Quasi War at
sea.” Sidak, supra note 224, at 1406 (footnote omitted); see also supra Part IV.B.
Second, the Alien Enemy Act curtails civil liberties of a specified class of persons
labeled “alien enemies,” including “all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of a hostile
nation or government, being of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be
within the United States and not actually naturalized.” Sidak, supra note 224, at 1408.
As originally drafted, the statute was applied only to males and amended during World
War I to apply equally to women. Id. at 1408 n.30 (citing Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, §
1, 1 Stat. 577; Act of Apr. 16, 1918, ch. 55, 40 Stat. 531).
237. Although the Alien Enemies Act sets forth circumstances that trigger its
applicability, namely, when either (1) a foreign nation or government attacks, or is about
to attack, the United States or (2) there is a formal declaration of war by the United
States, the law fails to set a specific time period that defines the duration of its
consequences. See 50 U.S.C. § 21 (1988). The Alien Enemies Act authorizes the President to
control the manner and degree of the restraint that aliens are subjected to as well as other
regulations deemed necessary for public safety. Sidak, supra note 224, at 1408–09.
238. Sidak, supra note 224, at 1420–24. The Alien Enemies Act’s “terms, purpose,
and construction leave no doubt” as to its preclusion of judicial review. Id. at 1421
(quoting Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 163–64). Aliens seeking judicial review must petition for
a writ of habeas corpus while sitting incarcerated and awaiting deportation, but many
times the incarceration can last as long as the hostilities that invoked the incarceration,
making judicial review pointless. See id. at 1421.
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security legislation.
2. Distinguishing Japanese Internment
On December 8, 1941, one day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor,
Congress declared war against Japan.239 Two months later, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066,240 which gave
broad authority to the military to secure U.S. borders and to remove any
individual, whether an American citizen or not, in order to create
military-only zones.241 Although Japanese Americans were not singled
out, the order ultimately removed and imprisoned nearly the entire
Japanese American population inhabiting America’s west coast.242
239. Declaration of War Against Japan, Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat. 795 (1941).
240. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092–93 (1938–1943). The order requires
every possible protection against espionage and sabotage to national defense material,
national defense premises, and national defense utilities. Id. The order specifically
provides the following:
[B]y virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the
Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to
time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action
necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such
extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from
which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right
of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever
restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may
impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide
for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation,
food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment
of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other
arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order.
Id. at 1093 (emphasis added). Congress later enacted legislation that ratified and
confirmed Executive Order 9066. See 18 U.S.C. § 97a (1946).
241. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. at 1093. On March 18, 1942, President
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9102, establishing the “War Relocation Authority,”
which reaffirmed Executive Order 9066 and provided for the “removal from designated
areas of persons whose removal is necessary in the interests of national security.” See
Exec. Order No. 9102, 3 C.F.R. 1123–25 (1938–1943).
242. See John Tateishi & William Yoshino, The Japanese American Incarceration:
The Journey to Redress, HUM. RTS., Spring 2000, at 10. The internment was ordered for
the purpose of protecting against “fifth column” sabotage or Japanese attack. Joel B.
Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of Constitutional
Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 649, 651
(1997). On March 2, 1942, General J.L. DeWitt, Military Commander of the Western
Defense Command, issued the first of four proclamations under the authority of
Executive Order 9066. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 86 (1943). The first
proclamation established that persons may be removed, as the situation may require, in
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Within eleven months after Pearl Harbor, 119,803 men, women, and
children of Japanese ancestry boarded buses and trains for government
detention camps in seven states.243 Two-thirds of those incarcerated
were U.S. citizens forced to abandon their businesses and homes,
“suffering extensive property, income, and psychological damage as a
result.”244
The validity of the government’s action ultimately made its way
through the courts in a trio of cases. First, in Hirabayashi v. United
States,245 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a curfew
placed on Japanese Americans.246 As a defense measure implemented to
safeguard important military areas from sabotage by sympathetic
persons of Japanese ancestry (and at a time of threatened air raids and
invasion by Japanese forces), the curfew order was ruled a proper
exercise of war powers.247 Further, the Court held that the curfew did
“military areas and zones” comprising “the southern part of Arizona [and] all the coastal
region of the three Pacific Coast states [including California, Washington, and Oregon].”
Id. at 86–87. The second proclamation expanded these areas. Id. at 87. The third
proclamation established curfew rules. In particular, it stated that from March 27, 1942,
all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to stay in their residences from eight
o’clock in the evening to six o’clock in the morning. Id. at 88. Violation of curfew led
to criminal penalties. Id. The fourth proclamation recited the need to provide the
orderly evacuation and resettlement of Japanese within the area, and “prohibited all alien
Japanese and all persons of Japanese ancestry from leaving the military area until future
orders should permit.” Id. at 89.
243. See Huong Vu, Note, Us Against Them: The Path to National Security Is
Paved by Racism, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 665 (2002) (arguing that racism shaped
national policy); see also Tateishi & Yoshino, supra note 242, at 10. Soon after the
military imposed curfew laws, the military posted notices ordering all Japanese aliens
and U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry “to report to assembly areas, and to bring with
them only what they could carry.” Id. The government referred to these areas as
“relocation centers.” Id. Japanese Americans were then deported and imprisoned behind
barbed wire in ten detention camps located in remote and desolate areas of “California,
Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, and Arkansas.” Id. “Life in the camps was
harsh, with internees enduring the desert heat, cold, and dust storms in hastily
constructed wooden barracks with no privacy, poor food, and very little in the way of
meaningful activity.” Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American
Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans as “Terrorists,” 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 5 (2001).
244. Vu, supra note 243, at 665; see also Philip Tajitsu Nash, Moving for Redress,
94 YALE L.J. 743, 743 (1985) (reviewing JOHN TATEISHI, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: AN
ORAL HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN DETENTION CAMPS (1984)).
245. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
246. Id. at 104.
247. Id. at 98–100. The Court’s inquiry to the constitutionality of the curfew laws
was:
whether in the light of all the facts and circumstances there was any substantial
basis for the conclusion . . . that the curfew as applied was a protective
measure necessary to meet the threat of sabotage and espionage which would
substantially affect the war effort and which might reasonably be expected to
aid a threatened enemy invasion.
Id. at 95. The facts and circumstances considered by the Court were (1) the fact that a
large number of resident alien Japanese were of “mature years” and occupied positions
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not unconstitutionally discriminate because the surrounding circumstances,
including the war and nature of Japanese communities in the United
States, afforded substantial bases for the military’s conclusion that
persons of Japanese ancestry required differential treatment.248
In Korematsu v. United States,249 the Court continued to grant the
military great deference by upholding the constitutionality of the
government’s forced relocation of Japanese Americans, even though the
threat of a Japanese invasion had all but disappeared.250 However, in Ex
of influence in Japanese communities, which they used to disseminate propaganda for
the Japanese Government; and (2) the fact that conditions affecting the life of the
Japanese resulted in little social intercourse between them and the “white population,”
further leading to sources of Japanese irritation and isolation. Id. at 98. Hirabayashi’s
conviction was later vacated in 1987. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591,
608 (9th Cir. 1987).
248. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100–02. The Court gave the government great
deference:
We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience, that in time
of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a
greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry. Nor can we deny
that Congress, and the military authorities acting with its authorization, have
constitutional power to appraise the danger in the light of facts of public
notoriety. We need not now attempt to define the ultimate boundaries of the
war power. We decide only the issue as we have defined it—we decide only
that the curfew order as applied, and at the time it was applied, was within the
boundaries of the war power. In this case it is enough that circumstances
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining
the national defense afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made.
Whether we would have made it is irrelevant.
Id. at 101–02.
249. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
250. See id. at 223. The petitioner, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was
convicted in federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a designated
military area from which all persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded pursuant to
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command.
Id. at 215–16. In upholding the conviction, the Court admitted: “Compulsory exclusion
of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions,” but
“when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces,
the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.” Id. at 219–20.
Moreover, the Court noted that Korematsu was not excluded from the designated
military area because of his race, but because the United States was
at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military
authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take
proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the
situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from
the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence
in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it must—determined
that they should have the power to do just this.
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parte Mitsuye Endo, the Court held that the government’s continued
detention of an admittedly “loyal” citizen at a time when hostilities were
coming to an end was not within the scope of the 1942 Act, which
ratified and confirmed executive order 9066.251 In Endo, the Court
prohibited lawmakers from placing a greater restraint on citizens than
what was “clearly and unmistakably” indicated in the language of
Executive Order 9066.252
Although issued at a time of war between Japan and the United States,
President Roosevelt’s executive orders similarly fail to meet all four
prongs of the security legislation test253 and are consequently unjustifiable
as appropriate national security measures. The first prong requires the
demonstration of aggression implicating a substantial U.S. interest.
Even in the midst of heavy criticism that race was the true reason
Japanese Americans were forced into internment camps,254 deference
must be given to the government’s judgment that the internment was
necessary to protect the substantial U.S. interest—that of safeguarding
against espionage and sabotage of national defense targets.255 The first
prong, however controversial, appears to be satisfied. Yet, Executive
Orders 9066 and 9012 do not fulfill the remaining three elements. First,
rather than affecting only a specified class of persons precisely defined
by statute, President Roosevelt’s orders allowed for the removal of “any
or all persons” from exclusive areas designated under the full discretion
of the Secretary of War.256 Second, the government failed to define the
Id. at 223. The petitioner’s conviction was later vacated on April 19, 1984. See
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
251. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944). The Court determined that
Americans of Japanese ancestry who accepted U.S. institutions and worked “loyally” for
the nation made a valuable contribution to the nation’s wealth and well-being. As such,
the Court noted that it was important, even at times of war, “to maintain a high standard
of fair, considerate, and equal treatment for the people of this minority as of all other
minorities.” Id. at 303–04.
252. See id. at 300.
253. See supra Part IV.B.
254. See Vu, supra note 243, at 672–73 (examining Japanese-U.S. race relations
and quoting President Roosevelt and General DeWitt as having deeply rooted antiJapanese sentiment and distrust over Japanese American loyalty). In newspaper
interviews, DeWitt was quoted as saying, “a Jap’s a Jap.” Id. at 673.
255. See supra note 240.
256. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092–93 (1938–1943). The affected class of
persons is vague, especially compared to the more specific Public Proclamation No. 3,
which declared the following:
[F]rom and after March 27, 1942, “all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, all
alien Italians, and all persons of Japanese ancestry residing or being within the
geographical limits of Military Area No. 1 . . . shall be within their place of
residence between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M.”
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88 (1943).
Compare also with the more specified March 24, 1942 civilian exclusion orders that
directed all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and nonalien, be excluded from a
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exact duration of the internment period, leaving the detention camps
solely in military control.257 Third, the orders failed to provide an
appropriate and specified appellate process by which Japanese
Americans could contest their detention.258
C. Dazed and Confused: Judicial Review in the Wrong Court
Assuming that national security concerns fail to justify depriving
foreign groups of their due process rights, the district court’s decision to
invalidate the AEDPA in Rahmani is unfounded because appellants must
challenge designations under the AEDPA in the D.C. Circuit.259 Both
disputants involved agreed that the D.C. Circuit was the sole venue for
judicial review of designations pursuant to § 1189.260 Nevertheless, the
court in Rahmani overstepped its bounds and ruled that the “tribunal
entrusted with reviewing . . . designation[s] for compliance with the
Constitution . . . is not the sole arbiter of Section 1189’s constitutionality.”261
Although § 1189 clearly directs petitioners to seek judicial review in
the D.C. Circuit, the court contended that the statute does not restrict
review exclusively to one court.262 Citing Johnson v. Robison,263 the
specified portion of Military Area No. 1 in Seattle from May 16, 1942. Id. The civilian
exclusion orders also required a member of each family, and each individual living
alone, affected by the order to report on May 11 or May 12 to a designated civil control
station in Seattle. Id. at 89.
257. The internment had no finite end date. The internment ended January 2, 1945,
but Executive Order 9066 remained in effect until President Gerald Ford rescinded it on
February 9, 1976. Vu, supra note 243, at 669 n.55 (“President Ford called the
evacuation and internment ‘national mistakes’ and a ‘setback to fundamental American
principles’” (quoting Proclamation No. 4417, 3 C.F.R. 8 (1976–1977)).).
258. Absent a specific procedure of judicial review, Japanese Americans’ only
chance to retain review was to be convicted for violating curfew and evacuation orders,
and to then seek to dismiss the indictments in court. See Saito, supra note 243, at 5 (tracking
the constitutional challenges brought by Japanese Americans Gordon Hirabayashi,
Minoru Yasui, Fred Korematsu, and Mitsuye Endo during World War II).
259. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1) (2000). It is true that the defendants in Rahmani
sought only to dismiss the indictments charging them with providing material support to
designated foreign terrorist organizations pursuant to § 2339B. United States v.
Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Yet, the defendants also
challenged the designations themselves because members of Congress disagreed with the
Secretary’s administrative record, causing a degree of uncertainty in the Secretary’s
designations. Id. at 1050–52. The district court went further in its analysis and chose to
review the designations at issue, despite having no statutory authorization pursuant to §
1189. See id. at 1053–54.
260. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
261. Id. at 1053–54 (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 1053.
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court refused to interpret the statute as restricting access to judicial
review without the government demonstrating “clear and convincing
evidence of Congressional intent to impose such a restriction.”264
Without explaining what the evidentiary standard entails or how the
government may meet this standard, the court concluded that the
language provided by § 1189 fails to “evince a clear and convincing
congressional intent to foreclose judicial review of a designation by
other federal courts.”265
Moreover, the court pointed to the D.C. Circuit’s past “inability to
conduct an effective judicial review” in both National Council and
People’s Mojahedin as further proof that the D.C. Circuit is not the only
court that may evaluate designations.266 In what can only be described
263. 415 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1974).
264. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1053–54. As an example of the D.C. Circuit’s “inability,” the district
court cited to an observation made by the D.C. Circuit in reviewing the designation of
the PMOI in the People’s Mojahedin opinion: “The information recited [in the
administrative record] is certainly not evidence of the sort that would normally be
received in court. It is instead material the Secretary of State compiled as a record, from
sources named and unnamed, the accuracy of which we have no way of evaluating.” Id.
at 1053 n.10 (citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19
(D.C. Cir. 1999)) (alteration in original). Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit’s general
frustration with the Secretary’s administrative record, the court in People’s Mojahedin
continued to perform its appellate function and determined that upon the Secretary’s
findings, the PMOI was properly designated. People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 24–25.
The D.C. Circuit realized that its only function was to decide if the Secretary, “on the
face of things,” had enough information to come to the conclusion that designated
organizations were (1) foreign and (2) engaged in terrorism. Id. at 25. As to whether the
terrorist activity of the organization threatened U.S. national security, the third factor in
designating a foreign terrorist organization under the AEDPA, the D.C. Circuit refrained
from resolving the issue because it raised a political question. Id. at 23–24 (citing Chi. &
S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (noting that judicial
review entails performing the role Congress intended for the court without thrusting the
judiciary into the political realm). Political questions, the D.C. Circuit explained, are
political judgments and “‘decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in the domain of political
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.’” Id. at 23 (quoting Chi. & S. Air
Lines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 111). The district court in Rahmani even agreed, refraining from
settling the debate between members of the legislative branch and the Secretary
regarding the designation of the MEK because “[w]hether the MEK is a foreign terrorist
organization presents a political question.” Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1051–52
(listing six independent factors indicative of a political question and concluding that for
the court to weigh in on the debate would create “the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”). The court noted
that while the decision to designate is “nonjusticiable” and better left for the greater
factfinding resources of Congress, the court may nonetheless review the designation
procedure for conformance with the Constitution. Id. at 1052. Contrary to the Rahmani
court’s perception, the D.C. Circuit demonstrated the ability, rather than the inability, to
conduct effective judicial review and to conduct the rather difficult task of acknowledging
a political question when presented.
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as unsubstantiated judicial commentary, the court specifically criticized
the D.C. Circuit for upholding designations while acknowledging, in the
same opinion, that a designation under the AEDPA violates due
process.267 With little reason, the court utilized its displeasure with the
D.C. Circuit as an excuse to weigh in on § 1189’s constitutionality even
though it lacked any statutory authorization to do so.
As to requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court’s reasoning is
flawed. The court in Johnson v. Robison addressed a statute that
prohibited substantive judicial review of decisions made by the
Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs (Administrator), who denied the
plaintiff’s application for educational assistance even though the plaintiff
claimed he was entitled to certain benefits as an eligible veteran of the
Armed Forces.268 The Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the statute
violated his First Amendment guarantee of religious freedom and Fifth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws.269 The Supreme
Court examined the history behind the statute’s “no-review” clause, by
which Congress intended to ensure that veterans’ benefits claims would
not burden the courts and that complex benefits decisions by the
Administrator would be made uniformly.270 However, the Court did not
find a congressional intention to bar judicial review of constitutional
questions and cited to the clear and convincing evidence standard set
forth in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.271
267. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. This criticism is from the D.C. Circuit
opinion in National Council. See supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text. As
evidence that the Rahmani decision is poorly written, the opinion openly criticizes
National Council without describing, analyzing, refuting, citing, or referring to any
specific component of National Council.
268. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 362–65 (1974). Under the statutory scheme
of the Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) provides:
On and after October 17, 1940, except as provided in sections 775, 784, and as
to matters arising under chapter 37 of this title, the decisions of the
Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by
the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans and their
dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or
any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any
such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
Id. at 365 n.5 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970)).
269. Id. at 364.
270. Id. at 369–70.
271. Id. at 373–74 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)). The
Court concluded that no explicit provision of § 211(a) bars the judicial consideration of
one’s constitutional claims. Id. at 367. Rather, the prohibitions intended to exclude
review solely of those “decisions of law or fact” that arose out of the administration of
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Similarly, Abbott Laboratories involved a statute that prohibited
substantive judicial review of claims contesting a regulation promulgated
by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs (Commissioner).272 The
regulation required manufacturers of prescription drugs to include on
labels and other printed material the drug’s “established name” as well as
its “proprietary” or trade name.273 The plaintiffs argued that this regulation
was beyond the statutory right conferred upon the Commissioner.274
After analyzing previous statutory drafts, including special review
procedures “applying to regulations embodying technical factual
determinations,” the Court concluded that Congress had never intended
to eliminate judicial review of other types of regulations enforced by the
Commissioner, including the regulation of drug labels.275
Unlike the legislation in Johnson and Abbott Laboratories, the
AEDPA does not limit substantive judicial review. Conversely, the
AEDPA authorizes the review of a variety of legal challenges. These
include claims, consistent with Johnson, that the Act is contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity, and that, consistent
with Abbott Laboratories, the Act is in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitation.276 The fact that Congress limits procedural review
to one court is inconsistent with the requirement that the government
demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent to
limit substantive judicial review. In essence, the district court is the
improper venue for review of § 1189’s constitutionality. The opinion in
Rahmani should therefore be stricken.277
providing benefits for veterans, not claims that arise under the Constitution. Id.
272. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 137–38.
273. Id. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the “‘established name’
is one designated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,” whereas the
“‘proprietary name’ is usually a trade name under which a particular drug is marketed.”
Id. at 138. The Act required manufacturers to print the established name of the drug
“prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary
name.” Id. at 137–38.
274. Id. at 138–39. The action was brought by thirty-seven drug manufacturers and
by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, which includes manufacturers of
more than ninety percent of the U.S. supply of prescription drugs. Id.
275. Id. at 144. Moreover, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act allows an
appeal on a record to an agency’s factual determination, such as the “level of tolerance
for poisonous sprays on apple crops,” under the substantial evidence test, thus “affording
a considerably more generous judicial review than the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ test
available in the traditional injunctive suit.” Id. at 143.
276. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3) (2000).
277. Perhaps the decision in Rahmani should not come as such a surprise. Presiding
Judge Robert M. Takasugi, along with his family, had been among the thousands
incarcerated by the United States in Japanese internment camps during World War II.
Michael R. Mitchell, Hon. Robert M. Takasugi, http://www.geocities.com/mraley.geo/
rmt.html (last revised Oct. 22, 1997). Not surprisingly, five months after Rahmani,
Judge Takasugi invalidated a new aviation law that prohibited non-U.S. citizens from
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V. CONCLUSION
The AEDPA is a necessary tool to be used in America’s quest to
combat new age threats of terrorism. The Act works to prevent the
United States from becoming a base for funding acts of terror. It deters
terrorist organizations, such as the al Qaeda network, acting as
multinational corporations with “operations, logistics, and financial
cells . . . all interlinked and interdependent,” from seeking aid in the very
country they seek to destroy.278 The AEDPA provides sufficient safeguards
to assure that the constitutional rights of loyal American citizens or those
who merely wish to express their affiliation with certain groups will not
be compromised, but that the rights of active donors and participants
may need to be.
For America to be successful in its quest to protect its national
security, Americans must understand that the war against terrorism will
not be won by a passive government. Radical views will not stay silent,
and terrorist cells will not vanish. Far from advocating a complete
confiscation of democratic principles and freedoms, Congress must be
allowed to suppress the effectiveness of an enemy that is void of flesh
and blood, name and face. Indeed, an encompassing hatred for the
United States is now the true enemy. Our nation must not be afraid to
fully use the Constitution to squash this sentiment.
The story continues. On July 22, 2003, a New York district court
added its opinion to the murky AEDPA landscape. In United States v.
Sattar,279 the court held the following: (1) Section 2339A(b) is
working as airport passenger and baggage screeners under the Constitution. News
Release, California District Judge Rules in Favor of Non-U.S. Citizen Airport Screeners,
Consulate General of the Philippines New York (Nov. 18, 2002), available at
http://philconsulateny.home.mindspring.com/news/news013.htm; see also Press Release,
Court Denies Government Motion to Dismiss Airport Screeners’ Case, National Asian
Pacific American Legal Consortium (Nov. 15, 2002), available at http://www.
napalc.org/programs/immigration/pr/2002-11-15_Gebin.htm.
278. See Phillip Carter, Al Qaeda and the Advent of Multinational Terrorism: Why
“Material Support” Prosecutions Are Key in the War on Terrorism, at http://writ.
news.findlaw.com/student/20030312_carter.html (Mar. 12, 2003) (describing the scope of
al Qaeda’s global Internet capacities, global money movement, and how the network
“hides behind legitimate businesses and charities”).
279. 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Defendants Ahmed Abdel Sattar (also
known as Dr. Ahmed), Yassir Al-Sirri, Lynne Stewart, and Mohammed Yousry “were
charged in a five-count indictment on April 8, 2002.” Id. at 352. Count two charged the
defendants with “providing and attempting to provide material support and resources” to
the Islamic Group (IG), which “existed as an international terrorist group dedicated to
opposing nations, governments, institutions, and individuals that did not share [its]
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unconstitutionally vague with regard to the statute’s prohibition on
providing material support or resources in the form of “communications
equipment” and “personnel”;280 (2) only designated terrorist organizations,
not individual defendants charged with providing material support to
designated terrorist organizations, can challenge the underlying
designation;281 and (3) the AEDPA did not violate the defendant’s First
radical interpretation of Islamic law.” Id. at 353. IG, while allegedly operating in the
New York metropolitan area from the early 1990s until the 2002 indictment, defined
“‘jihad’ as waging opposition against infidels by whatever means necessary” and
considered the United States as an infidel. Id. The indictment listed IG’s objectives in
the United States as (1) establishing “a staging ground for violent acts against targets in
the United States and abroad”; (2) “recruit[ing] and training of members”; and (3)
“fundraising for jihad actions in the United States and overseas.” Id. “[D]esignated as a
foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of State on October 8, 1997 [under §
1189],” IG was redesignated twice, first in October of 1999 and again on October 5,
2001. Id. In October 1995, IG’s spiritual leader Sheikh Abdel Rahman was convicted
for conspiring “to wage a war of urban terrorism against the United States, including the
1993 World Trade Center bombing and a plot to bomb New York City landmarks.” Id.
at 354. The indictment also charged that defendant Sattar served as a “vital link”
between Rahman and the worldwide IG leadership, and that Sattar acted as an IG
communications portal from New York City by maintaining frequent telephone contact
with global IG leaders. Id. at 355.
280. Id. at 358–60. The indictment alleged:
[T]he defendants and the unindicted co-conspirators provided communications
equipment and other physical assets, including telephones, computers and
telefax machines, owned, operated and possessed by themselves and others, to
IG, in order to transmit, pass and disseminate messages, communications and
information between and among IG leaders and members in the United States
and elsewhere around the world . . . .
Id. at 356 (citation omitted). The government initially argued in its brief that the
defendants were not charged simply for using their phones but rather for actively making
communications equipment available to IG that otherwise would be unavailable to a
designated foreign terrorist organization. Id. at 358. The government then “changed
course” and argued that the use of the defendants’ telephones alone constituted criminal
conduct under the statute. Id. The district court used this change in the government’s
interpretation of § 2339B as the basis for holding the provision of “communications
equipment” unconstitutionally vague: “[A] criminal defendant simply could not be
expected to know that the conduct alleged was prohibited by the statute.” Id. As to
“personnel,” the district court deferred to the Ninth Circuit decision in Humanitarian
Law Project v. Reno rather than United States v. Lindh, stating: “The fact that the ‘hard
core’ conduct in Lindh fell within the plain meaning of providing personnel yields no
standards that can be applied to the conduct by alleged ‘quasi-employees’ in this case.”
Id. at 359; see supra Part III.B.3.
281. Id. at 363–64. The district court found that, first, the AEDPA clearly allows a
designated foreign terrorist organization to challenge its designation in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia under § 1189(b), and second, individual defendants
could not raise a terrorist organization’s due process concerns because litigants “never
have standing to challenge a statute solely on the ground that it failed to provide due
process to third parties not before the court.” Id. at 364. The designation of IG as a
foreign terrorist organization, thus, was irrelevant as to the defendants. Id. In review,
the district court found the Rahmani holding, which allowed litigants to challenge the
due process of designation, neither binding nor persuasive. Id. The court further
distinguished Rahmani from Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953), and
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Amendment associational rights.282 More recently, on March 17, 2004,
the District Court for the Central District of California held another
component of § 2339A(b), the term “expert advice or assistance” added
by the Patriot Act in 2001, impermissibly vague, becoming the first
court to hold a part of the Patriot Act unconstitutional.283
As to United States v. Rahmani, the United States filed its appeal in
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 12, 2002.284 On April 3,
2003, the government filed its reply brief, and while it makes reference
to national security concerns, the government focuses on refuting the
defendants’ key arguments that the AEDPA violates First Amendment
freedom of association and expression.285 In a case of déjà vu, the
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), cases “in which the defendants
were allowed to challenge the administrative orders that formed the basis for their
prosecution although the relevant statutes did not provide for judicial review,” because
“[r]aising the defense in the criminal cases provided those defendants the only
meaningful review of the administrative proceeding affecting them.” Id. at 365–66. In
contrast, the AEDPA provides a designated organization, not defendants charged under
the AEDPA, with judicial review of its own designation, and “that review is not to occur
as a defense in a criminal proceeding.” Id. at 366. Moreover, the validity of the
designation is itself not an element of the offense of providing material support to
designated organizations (the government only needs to prove that the defendants
conspired to provide or did provide material support or resources to a designated
organization), thus the defendants’ due process right is not affected by their incapacity to
challenge the designation process. Id. at 367–68.
282. Id. at 368. The district court deferred to Humanitarian Law Project, holding
that the AEDPA does not interfere with First Amendment associational rights because
“the material support restriction ‘is not aimed at interfering with the expressive
component of [the defendant’s] conduct but at stopping aid to terrorist groups.’” Id. at
368 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000)).
283. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV 03-6107 ABC (MCx),
2004 WL 547534, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2004); see also Federal Judge Rules Part
of Patriot Act Unconstitutional, CNN.COM (Jan. 26, 2004) (quoting libertarian David
Cole, who argued the case against the provision, as proclaiming “the ruling ‘a victory for
everyone who believes the war on terrorism ought to be fought consistent with
constitutional principles’”), at http://www.CNN.com/2004/01/26/patriot.act.ap.
284. General Docket (No. 02-50355), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
U.S. v. Rahmani (filed July 17, 2002). After the district court ruling in Rahmani, one
U.S. official said that there would “be serious problems if the decision stands on appeal.”
Ben Barber, Judge Strikes Down Law Citing Groups as Terrorist, WASH. TIMES, June
27, 2002, at A01. For example, the U.S. government would no longer be able to
“prosecute those who give material support to groups . . . such as Hamas [also known as
the Islamic Resistance Movement], al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad [also known as the al-Jihad]
and Hezbollah [also known as Party of God and the Organization of the Oppressed on
Earth].” Id.; see also Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg.
52,650, 52,650–51 (Oct. 8, 1997).
285. Telephone Interview with Judith Heinz, Assistant United States Attorney,
United States Attorneys Office Criminal Division, Los Angeles, Cal. (Nov. 26, 2003).
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Ninth Circuit, as it did in Humanitarian Law Project, will again get a
chance to uphold the AEDPA in the face of these challenges. This
time, however, the court needs to do more. It needs to resurrect the
AEDPA and give national security the credence it deserves.
ANKUSH AGARWAL

The Ninth Circuit received an amicus brief from the ACLU of Northern California on
February 20, 2003, which was officially filed on July 30, 2003. Id. Oral argument took
place on September 9, 2003, submitted to Ninth Circuit Justices Andrew J. Kleinfeld,
Kim M. Wardlaw, and William A. Fletcher. Id.
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